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 Since the 1960s, classical rhetoric has been a significant site for theorizing 
composition pedagogy in the United States, informing scholarly work in the field and 
generating textbooks and teaching practices for first-year composition classes.  Despite 
the influence of ancient rhetorics, seen especially through the appropriation of 
Aristotelian argument, little attention has been given in composition studies to 
theorizing ethos, though the ancients found it a significant element of persuasion and 
even a purpose of rhetorical education.   
This study investigates classical conceptions of ethos as demonstrated through 
the texts of Isocrates, Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian; suggests reasons why 
contemporary scholars and teachers minimize or exclude ethos; and argues that ethos is 
a valuable concept to teach in composition classes. Postmodern sensibilities, student 
subjectivities, and digital communications, however, complicate any theory of ethos 
today: a reconception must include multiple contexts, multiple sites for ethos 
performance, and multiple ways of being in those locations.   
Border studies and theories provide a useful trope for conceptualizing a new 
ethos.  Reconceiving of ethos as located in borderlands opens up possibilities for 
helping students think critically about discursive contexts and the power relations 
inherent in them; provides opportunities for analyzing, evaluating, and creating 
persuasive electronic and print texts; and, following Henry Giroux, allows enactment of 





In On the Peace, Isocrates berates the citizens of Athens for being taken in by 
their current leaders, “depraved orators” who flatter in order to bolster their own power.   
Concerned about the reputation of Athens, Isocrates reminds his audience that they 
“shall be judged by the character of those who represent us at the head of the state” 
(43).  Isocrates accuses these leaders of designing their discourses to please rather than 
to tell the truth and, more important, of being disreputable characters in their daily lives.  
He points out that they have misled the people of Athens and damaged its good name.  
At the heart of Isocrates’ argument lies the claim that the state is in peril because its 
people have been blind to the character of their leaders, taken in, instead, by 
appearances and language designed to seduce. 
Isocrates is calling for deeper critical thinking. He wants the citizens of Athens 
to look carefully at various points of view and to determine what has influenced their 
decisions.  He is asking them to think about how they have been convinced that war is 
the best path to follow. He contends that they have been too willing to accept the words 
of disreputable leaders because of their own self-interest, too willing to accept the 
appearance of character, and incapable or unwilling to look at the complexities of 
character display.  In this discourse, Isocrates provides for us a lesson in the importance 
and the complications of ethos, the apparent character of the rhetor.  The people of 
Athens have allowed themselves to be influenced by their uninterrogated perceptions of 
ethos, and the result is damage to the state.  
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Isocrates’ concerns about the people of Athens apply to people in twenty-first 
century United States: we, too, are deceived by what we perceive as appealing 
character.  Highly publicized events within the United States have been guided by the 
public’s perception of character, but too often, just as in ancient Athens, displays of 
character are left uninterrogated.  Recent events in the public view provide us with 
significant examples of the power of ethos as perceived by the public: the impeachment 
of President Bill Clinton, the popularity of President George W. Bush, and, on a 
different note and scale, the outrage over James Frey’s representation of his book, A 
Million Little Pieces.  In each case, ethos, the apparent character of the man, has been a 
major factor in determining public opinion.   
Regardless of the political machinations and motivations behind Clinton’s 
impeachment, it is clear that the public view was focused on the character of the man, 
on what people considered his “moral” being.  Commentators, politicians, and people 
on the street were given media time to remark on the failures of Clinton’s character: he 
was an unfaithful husband, and he tried to hide that fact.  That his dalliances and 
personal dishonesties took precedence over policies and presidential acts in the public 
eye is testament to the important role of ethos in dominant U. S. culture today.  
Americans want to have leaders whose lives appear to be spotless or who seem 
adequately repentant.   
Likewise, the American public seems to respect leaders who give the appearance 
of strength.  Throughout his terms as president, George W. Bush has gained support 
from people who see him as “saved,” “rehabilitated” from his drug and alcohol abuse, 
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and stalwart in his insistence that the US will not be bullied.  At the same time, much of 
his appeal comes from the “good ole boy” ethos he has projected from the beginning of 
his political career.   Despite his privileged upbringing, many people in the U. S. think 
of him as “one of us.” For both of our most recent presidents, character—the ethos 
created by the men either deliberately or inadvertently and received by the public—has 
strongly influenced the support they have gained and, as a result, the processes and 
policies of the country.  The general population of the United States seems to place 
great value on character, yet the concept is accepted as uncomplicated common sense.  
The result is that ethos disciplines silently and powerfully throughout popular culture as 
well as politics. 
A recent example in popular culture of the importance placed on ethos is James 
Frey’s deception about the fictional nature of his book.  At issue is the creation of his 
ethos as a confessional writer telling the sordid details of his past and the subsequent 
revelation that this was an ethos constructed with exaggerated and manufactured details.  
This deception grew into a public flogging because Oprah Winfrey (an accepted and 
trustworthy public ethos, to be sure) was embarrassed that she had promoted him as an 
autobiographical rather than a fiction writer.  Frey’s crime was creating an ethos that 
was obviously deceptive, something Oprah and her public could not tolerate.  Had Frey 
claimed his text was fiction, only to have the public learn that it was autobiographical, 
there would have been no scandal.  It was his representation of himself—the ethos he 
created for a specific purpose—that offended the public. 
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Too often today public response to character weighs more than actions, despite 
the common knowledge that public personae are crafted, oftentimes by people who earn 
their money “handling” politicians and movie stars, creating images of their characters 
for popular consumption, other times by political opponents who focus on specific traits 
they can publicize as examples of bad character.  The attention given to President 
Clinton’s tawdry affair with his intern funneled tremendous amounts of energy—by 
politicians, media, and the general population, through sound waves and digital images 
and office conversations—into one man’s sexual behavior, and all the energy was 
devoted to debate over whether his behavior was moral or not, whether it was telling of 
other aspects of his character or not.  Clinton’s sexual life became far more important 
than his leadership in budget, international issues, and national stability.  Likewise, 
Bush’s ethos has driven his popularity more than his stewardship of the country’s 
economic situation or its international reputation.   
We live in a culture of appearance that damages us on national and international 
levels but also in our personal lives.  The drive to own and to become or appear to be 
controls private as well as public economies: people spend enormous amounts of money 
on cars, houses, electronics, and clothes that create desired appearances.  They buy cars 
that portray, or stand in, for themselves; they wear sporty clothes that make them seem 
to be athletes despite their never setting foot on a tennis court or jogging track.  We 
have become so accustomed to the emphasis on appearances that we scarcely question 
it.  As a result, being and seeming become conflated for people ill equipped to 
distinguish the two.   
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A recent, widely distributed email message is evidence of how entangled 
seeming and being have become.  Known as “Dr. Phil’s1 Test,” this message is a series 
of questions that promised to let its respondents know how other people perceived them, 
with the endorsement that “[t]his is a real test given by the Human Relations Dept. [sic] 
at many of the major corporations today.  It helps them get better insight concerning 
their employees and prospective employees.”2  The questions focus on personal 
feelings, preferences, and behaviors, such as “When do you feel your best?” and 
“Which of the following colors do you like most?”  The test asks about walking stride 
and posture, type of laugh, position for sleep.  Though the questions and answers 
address individual, personal, and often interior life, the score scales refer solely to how 
“others see you”; for example, people who score in a particular range are told, “Your 
friends see you as painstaking and fussy.”  The assumption is that if people adopt 
certain behaviors and preferences, then they will be perceived in a particular way.  It 
follows, then, that if we want to change how others perceive us, all we need to do is 
change our color preference, stand taller, laugh more loudly, or sit with legs crossed.  
The assumption, too, is that the general population desires this information and believes 
it to be important.  Indeed, this “test” appears on over a hundred websites and blogs 
with wide-ranging purposes: while it appears on joke and comedy sites, as well as on 
two (Break the Chain.org and snopes.com) that debunk it, the “test” is also seriously 
                                                
1 Dr. Phil is Phillip McGraw, a psychologist who became a media figure after helping Oprah Winfrey win 
a lawsuit against Texas cattle ranchers.  Because of her work with him in that case, Oprah scheduled him 
to appear regularly on her television show.  His popularity allowed him to produce his own daily 
television program, which is still in production at the time of this writing.  Though his dramatic, 
homegrown, pop psychology is scorned by many, he remains a popular media figure. 
2 Like many email texts forwarded widely, this one has no attribution.  I first received it from a student 
who had simply forwarded it to everyone on her mailing list.    
 
 6 
presented on websites ranging from The Multiple Sclerosis Resource Centre of the U. 
K. (www.msrc.co.uk/index.cfm?fuseaction=show&pageid=529)  to Tundra Solutions 
(tundrasolutions.com/forums/off-topic/18161-dr-phils-test/), a site “[w]here you can 
research, discuss, and repair your Toyota, Scion, or Lexus.”  The appeal of this 
misdirected interest in ethos can also be found on Senior Bachelor.com, a Viggo 
Mortensen fan site, a forum for discussing boxing, a site for British expats, and the DST 
Technical Services Corporation website, among many others.  The point is that the idea 
behind this fraudulent test appeals to a wide range of people.  Clearly, within popular 
culture, as well as in politics, people view ethos—character as it is revealed to others—
as significant. 
This uninterrogated power of ethos in public and private life today suggests an 
area of concern for those of us who study and teach rhetoric.  With the emphasis on 
appearances, one would expect the dominant culture in the U. S. to insist that an 
educated public understand that appearances are created, to insist that the public know 
how appearances can deceive or benefit us and understand the ethical dimensions of 
creating appearances.  By observing political and popular culture today, we can discern 
that ethos matters, but it is also easy to see that the public is not intellectually prepared 
to interrogate ethos created for public consumption.   Those of us who teach 
composition and rhetoric at the college level should take the cue, revising our curricula 
to include attention to ethos—what it is, how it is created, and how to interrogate it.   As 
teachers of composition, our role is to help our students become more effective writers, 
of course, but in order to do that, we must also assist in educating them for their lives as 
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citizens and help them become less susceptible to and naïve about what influences their 
thinking.  Just as Isocrates pleads with the citizens of Athens to think carefully about 
how their political decisions have been created by deceptive ethos, we need to help our 
students understand the power of ethos, so they can interrogate it in displays by others 
and use it ethically in their own discourses.   
To create a pedagogy of ethos, we need a conceptual framework for designing 
course work, one which is responsive to constructions of ethos as they are made 
manifest today.  I set out on this project to learn more about ethos—how it might be 
defined, interrogated, and theorized for application in composition classes.  In the 
following chapters, I provide a brief review of classical conceptions of ethos; address 
some of the difficulties of teaching ethos in a postmodern, image-saturated, digital 
culture; argue that instruction in ethos is relevant, even important, to composition 
courses, and, drawing on Gloria Anzaldua and Henry Giroux’s theories of border 
cultures, I examine borderlands as a relevant metaphorical site for developing a new 
conception of ethos.  Finally, I propose a theory of borderlands ethos, one that is more 
responsive to contemporary demands than previous conceptions of ethos, and suggest 
pedagogical possibilities for it. 
 Throughout the project, I have become more convinced of the importance of 
making ethos a significant part not only of composition instruction but of instruction in 
other humanities courses as well.  Looking at how writers, speakers, and artists 
represent themselves through their work is an important key to understanding how their 
creations of words and images affect their audiences, and students who understand such 
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possible effects can learn to perform their thinking, writing, and reading at a more 
























Chapter 1:  Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Scholarship in Composition 
 Since the 1960s, a resurgence of interest in theories and applications of classical 
rhetoric has been central to the development of composition studies.  Edward P. J. 
Corbett’s 1963 presentation at the Conference on College Composition and 
Communication, “The Usefulness of Classical Rhetoric,” and the subsequent (1965) 
publication of his Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student mark a serious 
investigation of the ancients’ approaches to teaching and theories of communication.  
Looking primarily to Aristotle, various twentieth-century scholars adapted classical 
notions to their theories of teaching and learning rhetoric.  Stephen M. North, in The 
Making of Knowledge in Composition: Portrait of an Emerging Field, suggests that 
linking composition to rhetoric was a way to prove composition as a valid discipline 
and credits Corbett, Richard E. Hughes, Gayle B. Price, James C. Raymond, and Frank 
D’Angelo, among others, for initiating the turn back toward the ancients (64-68).  
Regardless of the reason for appropriating classical rhetorical theories, scholarship in 
that area flourished.  
The interest in classical rhetoric as a site for theorizing composition was not a 
momentary trend; rather, in the 1980s, scholarship in classical rhetoric grew in depth 
and breadth, initiated by the publication of George A. Kennedy’s Classical Rhetoric 
and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (1980), a 
detailed history which traces developments of classical rhetoric over centuries.  Later in 
the decade, scholarship in classical rhetoric widened, as evidenced by the publication of 
two collections of essays on the subject, one by James J. Murphy, The Rhetorical 
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Tradition and Modern Writing (1982), the other by Corbett’s former students, Robert 
Connors, Lisa Ede, and Andrea Lunsford, Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern 
Discourse (1984).   
In the 1990s, studies of classical rhetoric reached another peak, with the 
publication of Kathleen Welch’s The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: 
Appropriations of Ancient Discourse (1990), Susan Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists 
(1991), Richard Leo Enos’s Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle (1993), Cheryl Glenn’s 
Rhetoric Retold (1997), and Sharon Crowley’s Composition in the University (1998).  
These studies are expansions and revisionings of the historical approaches of previous 
decades.  They situate classical theories in time and place and include voices, primarily 
of women and the Sophists, previously ignored; they challenge the dominance of Plato 
and Aristotle; and they implicitly (if not explicitly) call into question traditional 
applications of classical rhetoric.  Basically, these scholars of the 1990s opened the door 
to reinterpretations of classical rhetoric and provided models for the production of 
knowledge about the relationship between the teaching of composition and classical 
rhetoric. 
This brief sketch of the integration of classical rhetoric into composition studies 
serves to underscore the relevance—indeed, the importance—of classical rhetoric as a 
site for thinking about how we teach composition.  Interest in the ancients has most 
definitely influenced how many of us think about and teach composition.   In the late 
twentieth century, in fact, several textbooks focusing on classical rhetoric were 
published for use in first-year composition classes.  In addition to Corbett’s Classical 
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Rhetoric for the Modern Student, initially published in 1965 with its fourth edition 
published in 1999, Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetorics for 
Contemporary Students has been available since 1994 and is now in its fourth edition, 
published in 2008.  Although the titles of these textbooks call attention to their reliance 
on classical rhetoric, other textbooks, though not titled as such, draw upon ancient 
theories, especially Aristotle’s, within their pages.  The influence of Aristotelian 
argument can be seen in composition textbooks from all the major publishers.  A 
sampling of argument textbooks based on Aristotle includes the following:  
• from McGraw-Hill, Dorothy U. Seyler’s Read, Reason, Write, 8th 
(2008); Timothy Crusius and Carolyn Channell’s Aims of Argument, 5th 
(2006);  William Vesterman’s Reading and Writing Short Arguments, 5th 
(2006); Barbara Fine Clouse’s The Student Writer: Editor and Critic, 7th 
(2008);  
• from Bedford-St. Martin’s, Rise Axelrod, Charles Cooper, and Alison 
Warriner’s Reading Critically, Writing Well, 8th (2008); Sylvan Barnet 
and Hugo Bedau’s Critical Thinking, Reading, and Writing, 6th (2008); 
Barnet and Bedau’s Current Issues and Enduring Que|tions, 8th (2008); 
Annette Rottenberg and Donna Haisty Winchell’s Elements of Argument, 
8th (2006);  
• and from Pearson, William Palmer and Dean Memering’s Discovering 
Arguments: An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Writing, 2nd (2005); 
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and John D. Ramage, John C. Bean, and June Johnson’s Writing 
Arguments, 7th (2007).   
Each of these textbooks includes one or more of the following characteristics that 
identify them as Aristotelian in their conception and presentation of rhetoric: focus on 
persuasion, instruction in formal logic, attention to enthymeme and to deductive and 
inductive reasoning, introduction to rhetorical triangle, instruction in the technical 
means of persuasion (logos, pathos, ethos).  In most cases, these textbooks do not 
present a “pure” version of Aristotle’s rhetoric but have adopted Stephen Toulmin’s3 
version, expanded from Aristotle’s.  Still, the basis for current instruction using these 
textbooks derives from ancient Greece, whether it is identified as such or not.   The 
point is this: rhetorical theory as formulated by the ancients, especially Aristotle, 
impacts how composition is taught today, at least in selective ways4.  While it is not 
unusual to find composition textbooks that instruct in Aristotelian rhetoric, especially 
those books which focus on argumentation, it is difficult to find more than a cursory 
mention of ethos as one of the technical triad, usually with greater emphasis given to 
logos and pathos.   One has to wonder why, especially since other aspects of ancient 
rhetoric have been adopted and followed enthusiastically.  But before speculating about 
the reasons for the minimization or exclusion of ethos, we should examine how the 
                                                
3 In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin proposes an elaboration of Aristotelian argument.  Less 
formal and more easily adaptable to contemporary rhetorical situations, the Toulmin schema places 
greater emphasis on rhetor-audience relationship and interaction. 
4 Susan Jarratt emphasizes Aristotle’s dominance in contemporary composition instruction, pointing out 
that Corbett and Kinneavy, two theorist teachers with wide-spread influence “rely directly on Aristotle in 
making available for the first time to twentieth-century composition teachers a fully developed history 
and a theory of rhetoric.  Even when Aristotle is not the center of a work, the application of tools such as 
the tripartite division of persuasive techniques (logos, ethos, and pathos) or the communication triangle 
index his influence” (xvii). 
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ancients thought about it, what they had to say about what ethos is and its relevance in 
persuasion.  
 
Classical Conceptions of Ethos 
 The conception of ethos, even in antiquity, has not been stable.  Although the 
major rhetoricians who wrote or spoke about the character of the rhetor—Isocrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian—agreed that ethos is important and agreed that 
it had something to do with the character of the speaker or writer, they did not agree 
about its constitution.  This review outlines the dominant early conceptions of ethos and 
their distinctions in order to both stabilize the term and introduce contradictions and 
problems in conceptualizing ethos.   
 In general, conceptions of ethos in classical rhetoric have the following 
similarities: 
1. Ethos is a means of persuasion located in the character of the rhetor. 
2. Ethos is important in effective discourse. 
3. It may be constructed for the moment of discourse, but true character resides in 
a person and is more than a momentary construction. 
4. The idea of ethos, its deployment, and its reception are connected to the polis. 






The Importance of Ethos in Classical Rhetorical Training 
In his plan for educating the perfect orator, Isocrates emphasizes the importance 
of good character in the man5 who desires to be persuasive. His plan for educating the 
boys of Athens, outlined in Against the Sophists and more fully articulated in Antidosis, 
includes training of mind (philosophy) and body (gymnastics).  At the heart of Isocrates' 
pedagogy is instruction in the art of discourse, not simply training to make speeches but 
training to "think right," for "the man who wishes to persuade people will not be 
negligent as to the matter of character" (Antidosis 278).  This concept initiates the 
notion realized most famously by Quintilian=s requirement that an orator be a good 
man speaking well.  Both George Kennedy (33) and Kathleen Welch (123) attest to the 
evolution of this idea from Isocrates through Cicero to Quintilian.   
Aristotle, within the same century as Isocrates’ Antidosis, systematized rhetoric 
and classified ethos as one of the artistic pisteis, a means of persuasion “prepared by 
method and by ‘us’” (Aristotle I.2.2 1355a).  He explains: “[There is persuasion] [sic] 
through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker 
worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more 
quickly [than we do others] [sic] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases 
where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt” (I.2.4 1356a).  In De Oratore, 
Cicero, too, addresses the power of the apparent character of the rhetor: “It is of 
peculiar advantage that indications of good-nature, of liberality, of gentleness, of piety, 
of grateful feelings, free from selfishness and avarice, should appear in him” (II. 43).  
                                                
5 "Man" here is not intended to be the androcentric but universalized "man" identifying both male and 
female humans; it is limited here as it was in ancient Greece and Rome to mean a male citizen. 
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Quintilian claims in Institutio Oratoria that his interest is in “the education of the 
perfect orator”6 and claims that “[t]he first essential for such an one is that he should be 
a good man, and consequently we demand of him not merely the possession of 
exceptional gifts of speech, but of all the excellences of character as well” (I.9-10).  In 
the case of our four key classical rhetoricians, then, there is agreement about the 
importance of the speaker’s apparent character.  What is not made clear by the previous 
quotations taken out of context, however, is the variation in how these four see the 
constitution of character.   
 
Being and Seeming: The Construction of Ethos in Classical Rhetoric 
Although Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian contend that the character 
of the rhetor is an important means of persuasion, their beliefs about how character is 
constituted and deployed differ, not in substance but in degrees, and these differences 
raise interesting questions about what ethos is, whether it is constructed for the moment 
of discourse or is derived from the virtue (or lack of virtue) of the rhetor.  Must a rhetor 
be or simply seem virtuous, trustworthy, credible?  For Isocrates, ethos is constituted by 
the actual character of the rhetor, not by the apparent ethos created for the moment of 
the discourse but the consistent character of the speaker as he lives his life.  Indeed, 
Isocrates asserts that the "argument which is made by a man's life is of more weight 
than that which is furnished by words [. . .]" (Antidosis 278).  Isocrates demonstrates a 
                                                
6 The idea of educating the “perfect” orator is not new with Quintilian.  We can see the same in Isocrates’ 
plan for training the perfect orator and in the interest Cicero expresses in the subtitle of De Oratore: On 
the Ideal Orator. 
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model ethos in Antidosis, his autobiographical oration.7   This text is an appropriate site 
for investigating Isocrates’ views on ethos for several reasons: first, because its stated 
purpose is to reveal his character--Isocrates writes that his intent is Ato compose a 
discourse which would be, as it were, a true image of my thought and of my life@ 
(Antidosis 7); second, because within Antidosis, Isocrates includes passages from 
several of his other texts, providing us with a broad range of his work over time; third, 
because in this text he lays out his beliefs about education, his primary area of concern 
and the activity into which his ethos is most characteristically applied; fourth, because 
this text, though written, is crafted as a speech, so Isocrates’s voice is clear—this is not 
a distant ethos proclaiming from on high but the voice of a human speaking to other 
humans.  Beginning with the opening passage of this text, he reveals his character, 
making his audience fully aware of his presence:  
If the discourse which is now about to be read had been like the speeches 
which are produced either for the law-courts or for oratorical display, I 
should not, I suppose, have prefaced it by any explanation.  Since, 
however, it is novel and different in character, it is necessary to begin by 
setting forth the reasons why I chose to write a discourse so unlike any 
other; for if I neglected to make this clear, my speech would, no doubt, 
impress many as curious and strange.  (Antidosis 1) 
                                                
7Werner Jaeger observes that Antidosis is the Afirst real example of autobiography@ (133).  Although 
this text is considered autobiography, it is a defense Isocrates wrote to a fictional situation he created in 
response to “mistaken ideas” about him (Antidosis 6). 
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From the first sentences of this text, we are aware of the voice Isocrates has 
constructed, through his use of first person pronouns, of course, but also through the 
ethos he communicates.  Even in this short passage, Isocrates appears to be 
knowledgeable about rhetoric—he understands the demands of various rhetorical 
situations, and he makes clear that this situation is different from others.  And he is 
concerned about audience reception—he does not want them to find his style 
inappropriate.  Throughout Antidosis, Isocrates presents himself as a humble, elderly 
man confronted with a difficult task, more than once drawing attention to his advanced 
age, pointing out that he is Ano longer in the prime of youth but in [his] eighty-second 
year,@ asking forgiveness for his speech appearing Aless vigorous@ than it was in the 
past (9), and expressing concern that he cannot, at his advanced age, do justice to the 
important subjects of this defense: “to protect myself from my accuser and to champion 
the cause of liberal education@ (176, 178).  His references to age here both demonstrate 
his modesty and establish that he is to be respected because of his advanced maturity.   
Isocrates crafts an ethos that may be characterized as reasonable, even-handed.  
This can be seen especially in his treatment of the Sophists.  While he distances himself 
from them, he defends them as well, pointing out that they have had good results: their 
students, he says, Ahave not been duped nor affected as [the detractors] claim, but that 
some of them have been turned out competent champions and others able teachers@ 
(204).  A reasonable ethos, such as this one crafted by Isocrates, has persuasive 
capabilities that a less even-handed and simplistic presentation would not in this 
circumstance. Isocrates points out that he is humble, reasonable, consistent, and 
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honest— all characteristics that suggest a model, an ideal, persuasive character for this 
moment of discourse.  Still, his purpose is to defend himself against his detractors, and 
the subject of Antidosis is his character as he lives his life.  Isocrates models character 
construction for a specific discourse, making clear that he is fashioning his character to 
the demands of the rhetorical situation, even though the situation is manufactured, but 
he also provides ample examples from his life to demonstrate the worthiness of his 
character.  The significance of Isocrates’ application of his ideas about character is that 
while he is able to construct an ethos appropriate and appealing to the rhetorical 
situation, he not only argues but demonstrates that character resides within the rhetor, 
that the character on display is a representation of the virtue developed within the 
person.   
 The question of whether ethos is a surface construction or the result of moral 
development apparently interested Cicero as well.  In De Oratore, there are instructions 
on how to demonstrate character but also exhortations about the importance of virtue.  
The following passage is an excellent example of how Cicero sees the relationship.  
First, Cicero’s Antonius explains the value of the rhetor’s actual character: 
It contributes much to success in speaking that the morals, principles, 
 conduct, and lives of those who plead causes, and of those for whom 
 they plead, should be such as to merit esteem, and that those of their 
 adversaries should be such as to deserve censure; and also that the minds 
 of those before whom the cause is pleaded should be moved as much as 
 possible to a favorable feeling, as well toward the speaker as toward him 
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 for whom he speaks.  The feelings of the hearers are conciliated by a 
 person’s dignity, by his actions, by the character of  his life; particulars 
 which can more easily be adorned by eloquence if they really  
 exist, than be invented if they have no existence.  (II.43) 
He goes on to describe the manner a persuasive speaker must adopt: 
But the qualities that attract favor to the orator are a soft tone of voice, a 
 countenance expressive of modesty, a mild manner of speaking; so that if 
 he attacks any one with severity, he may seem to do so unwillingly and 
 from compulsion.  It is of peculiar advantage that indications of good-
 nature, of liberality, of gentleness, of piety, of grateful feelings, free from 
 selfishness and avarice, should appear in him; and every thing that 
 characterizes men of probity  and humility, not acrimonious, nor 
 pertinacious, not litigious, nor harsh, very  much conciliates 
 benevolence, and alienates the affections from those in whom such 
 qualities are not apparent.  (II.43) 
Cicero addresses the distinction between seeming and being by alternating between the 
two.  He emphasizes the value of being, yet he returns to instructions on what kinds of 
voice, countenance, and manner are persuasive.  As the passage continues, Antonius 
explains how to describe the people whose causes the orator represents—“just, full of 
integrity, religious, unpresuming, and patient of injuries”—and claims that “such a 
description [. . .] has so much influence, if it is agreeably and judiciously managed, that 
it often prevails more than the merits of the cause” (II. xliii. 133).  Cicero understood 
 
 20 
the power of appearances.   Indeed, according to James M. May in “Ciceronian Oratory 
in Context,” the character of the orator was a powerful influence for the people of 
Rome:  
A people who built their history on the deeds of great forebears, a people 
 for whom traditional virtues and the mos maiorum had become almost a 
 kind of religion, a people who were bound by the close ties of the client-
 patron relationship, and to whom personal authority (auctoritas) was of 
 utmost concern, were certain to be influenced in their decisions by the 
 force of individual character.  Cicero well-appreciated the great potential 
 that proof based on character (ethos) offered the orator for persuading a 
 Roman audience [. . .]. (60)  
Just as Isocrates demonstrates the ability to create an appropriate, appealing character 
for the moment of discourse, Cicero instructs rhetors to consider how they will appear 
to their audiences, but that is not all: for Cicero, eloquence is not possible without 
knowledge and good judgment.  Crassus tells Antonius that “eloquence is one of the 
most eminent virtues” and that “the greater is its influence, the more necessary it is that 
it should be united with probity and eminent judgment for if we bestow the faculty of 
eloquence upon persons destitute of these virtues, we shall not make them orators, but 
give arms to madmen” (III.15).  For Isocrates and Cicero, then, ethos includes both 
being and seeming, yet this final passage from Cicero points up a serious concern: is it 
possible for a disreputable, even evil, person to be eloquent and persuasive?  Crassus 
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indicates that it is and expresses his concern about teaching someone without virtue to 
be eloquent.  
 This dilemma of educating someone with less than virtuous character towards 
persuasiveness is articulated later by Quintilian as well.   Although he reiterates 
throughout Institutio Oratoria the importance of the character of the rhetor and the 
necessity that character reside in the person rather than in the moment of discourse, he 
seems, like Cicero’s Crassus, to be troubled by the question of whether a person without 
virtue can be eloquent.  Although he addresses this question earlier in the Institutio, he 
struggles with it in the last chapter, where he admits that it “is by far the most arduous 
portion of the task which I have set myself to perform” and contends that “there can be 
nothing more pernicious than eloquence to public and private life alike” (XII.i.1).  He 
deals with this idea of pernicious eloquence basically by dismissing it.  He says quite 
simply that a person without virtue cannot be an orator. His practical reason is that 
people with evil desires, because they are so busy following their passions, cannot find 
the time to devote themselves to the study necessary to becoming orators.  His argument 
falters, though, as he progresses through the passage, when he strikes out at those who 
might raise the question:  “let me assume the existence of a man so obstinately blind to 
the truth as to venture to maintain that a bad man equipped with the same talents, 
industry and learning will be not a whit inferior to the good man as an orator; and let me 
show that he too is mad” (XII.i.10).  If we are looking to Quintilian—and well we 
should since he addresses ethos at length, more than Isocrates, Aristotle, or Cicero—to 
resolve for us the issue of whether ethos resides in discourse or in the person of the 
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rhetor, we will not be rewarded.  This happens (or fails to happen) for several reasons.  
First, Quintilian contradicts himself.  He goes so far as to say that the man is the 
argument.  In fact, he declares that a good man making false statements is more 
convincing than a bad man can be, and he argues that even bad men who masquerade as 
good are eventually exposed, that they cannot maintain the manufactured ethos.  
Interestingly, though, he addresses the ethos of Cicero and Demosthenes, pointing out 
that they were both believed by many to be less than virtuous.  Although he begins by 
saying that he does not believe the claims against them are strong enough to take 
seriously, he ends his judgment of Cicero by locating his character in his words, not in 
his lived life:  “the best answer to these critics is to be found in his own words [ . . .]” 
(XII. i. 14).  This faltering argument loses additional credibility when Quintilian 
reminds us that his subject is the “perfect orator” and that, though he has said and will 
continue to say that Cicero was a perfect orator, he hedges, saying that  
had [Cicero] been granted longer life and less troubled conditions for the 
 composition of his works, [he] would doubtless have spoken better still.  
 I shall  not lay myself open to the charge of ungenerous criticism, if I say 
 that I believe  that he failed actually to achieve that perfection to the 
 attainment of which none  have approached more nearly [ . . . ].” 
 (XII.i.22) 
Finally, Quintilian reminds us that his task is molding the perfect orator, not simply an 
eloquent rhetor, and reiterates that even if a bad man could be eloquent, he could not be 
considered an orator.  
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 One interesting element of this last chapter of the Institutio is the dissolution of 
Quintilian’s carefully constructed ethos.  As he presents his instructions for rhetorical 
education earlier in the text, his ethos is characterized by his generous consideration of 
the rhetoricians who have come before him, his concern that his methods be fully 
understood, and his careful attention to the details of his concepts. In this final chapter, 
however, Quintilian’s distress is made obvious by the multiple failed attempts to arrive 
at a reasonable conclusion about the relationship between the actual character of the 
rhetor and the ethos constructed for the moment of discourse.  In The Electronic Word: 
Democracy, Technology, and the Arts, Richard Lanham notes Quintilian’s dilemma and 
how he dispatches it, side-stepping the issue and indicating that of course oratory must 
be good because he has dedicated his life to it:  
[H]e reflects that if oratory serves only to empower evil (si vis illa 
dicendi malitiam instruxerit) then what has he spent his life doing?  And 
not only that, what has nature done to us, if she allows something like 
that?  Turned language, man’s best friend, into a potential enemy?  To 
confront this question honestly would imperil his entire endeavor and so, 
with that genial resolution which illustrates his sweet nature throughout 
the Institutio, he assumes the answer he wants and then goes on to 
bolster it with inventively adapted Platonism. (155) 
Despite his lack of resolution on this issue, Quintilian placed great faith in the process 
of rhetorical instruction and study, seeing this process itself as a way to improve the 
man.  Such faith in rhetorical instruction is not new with Quintilian.  Isocrates 
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especially valorizes instruction in speaking well, for “when anyone elects to speak or 
write discourses which are worthy of praise and honour, it is not conceivable that he 
will support causes which are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels, and not 
rather those which are great and honourable, devoted to the welfare of man and our 
common good” (Antidosis 337 - 39).  It is in the desire to persuade that Isocrates locates 
virtue in discourse, for this interest in persuasion necessitates the rhetor’s use of the best 
materials, “those examples which are the most illustrious and the most edifying” 
(Antidosis 339).   And the process of learning the examples and working with them in 
order to persuade improves the rhetor himself: “habituating himself to contemplate and 
appraise such examples, he will feel their influence not only in the preparation of a 
given discourse but in all the actions of his life.  It follows, then, that the power to speak 
well and think right will reward the man who approaches the art of discourse with love 
of wisdom and love of honour” (Antidosis 339).  Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian 
clearly wrestled with a crucial dilemma in understanding ethos—the problem of being 
versus seeming.  Their lack of resolution in this matter is testament to the difficulty of 
the issue. 
In this discussion so far, I have held Plato in abeyance.  His works do not 
reference the character of the rhetor in the same ways as the works of the four thinkers 
included so far.  On the surface and with limited reading of Plato, one might dismiss his 
thoughts on rhetoric as simply immaterial to any consideration of ethos.  I contend, 
though, that through Plato’s works, specifically Gorgias and Phaedrus, the problems of 
being and seeming are both heightened and eliminated, a paradox for certain, but one 
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which underscores the dilemma that has confronted and continues to confront 
rhetoricians.  Plato’s concern is the perfection of the soul. His distaste for rhetoric, in 
fact, derives from those concerns: he sees the men who call themselves rhetoricians 
more interested in persuasion than in the search for truth.  In both Gorgias and 
Phaedrus, his Socrates vigorously condemns rhetoric for what he sees as its neglect of 
the soul.   
Plato’s strongest condemnations of rhetoric appear in Gorgias, where Socrates 
claims that it is a “knack” like “cookery” which simply produces “gratification and 
pleasure” (462).  In this dialogue, Socrates bases his distaste for rhetoric on the ability 
of orators to speak persuasively without knowledge: they can create the appearance of 
knowledge and create belief in their audiences.  The distinction between belief and 
knowledge parallels our dilemma in defining ethos, the distinction between seeming and 
being.  Plato clearly endorses knowledge and being, rejecting any value in believing and 
seeming.  Even though Plato sustains the emphasis on knowing and being, his 
discussion of rhetoric in Phaedrus is less polemical.  While in Gorgias he suggests that 
dialectic is so far superior to rhetoric that they cannot be compared, in Phaedrus, he 
treats rhetoric with greater respect, acknowledging that it can be related to philosophy.  
Ramsey Eric Ramsey, in “A Hybrid Techne of the Soul” provides an interesting reading 
of Phaedrus, asserting that “[f]rom a certain hermeneutic position, the whole of the 
Phaedrus can be read as Plato’s dealing with the ramifications of the relation between 
philosophy and rhetoric” (256).  He claims that Phaedrus suggests the importance of 
rhetoric, that “Plato recognizes that he cannot do without rhetoric any more than 
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rhetoric can do without philosophy [. . .] .  [He] recognized that his metaphysics and his 
concerns for justice mean little in the silence of a world without discourse, regardless of 
how many dangers rhetoric might raise in its wake” (257).   Indeed, it is difficult to take 
Plato’s disdain for rhetoric or writing too seriously since he excelled in using them.  
George Kennedy calls Plato a “consummate rhetorician” and says that “[n]o dialogue of 
Plato is untouched by rhetoric [. . .]” (Classical Rhetoric 42).  Indeed, Plato’s means of 
instruction towards perfection of the soul relied heavily on the use of rhetoric. 
For Plato, there would never be a question about the location or development of 
ethos; such a consideration would be of no use because, for him, true discourse resides 
in the desire for wisdom, the understanding of beauty and justice.  As Socrates and 
Phaedrus discuss the difference between rhetoric and dialectic, Socrates characterizes 
rhetoric as formal, merely a set of devices and arrangements learned in the service of 
persuasion, and points out to Phaedrus that these practices can be used for good or ill, to 
“make trifles seem important and important things seem trifling through the power of [. 
. .] language” (267).  He asserts that for rhetoricians, “a man who is going to be a 
competent speaker need have nothing at all to do [. . .] with truth about just or good 
conduct, or indeed about just and good men, whether they are so by nature or by 
education.  In the courts, they maintain, nobody gives a damn about the truth in these 
matters; all they care about is what is plausible—that is to say, what is probable [. . .] .” 
(272).  We can surmise, then, that Plato’s view is that ethos constructed artificially for 
persuasive purposes is evidence only of the immorality of rhetoric.  For Plato’s 
Socrates, the key to the “true art of rhetorical persuasion” is “knowledge and practice” 
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(269), and this practice requires a “loftiness of mind that by all means and at all times 
strives to attain perfection” (270).   Without a desire for wisdom and an understanding 
of the soul, no discourse is worthy of consideration.  
The purported point of this dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus is to 
evaluate a speech by Lysias.  At the end of the dialogue, to sum up, Socrates says he 
and Phaedrus, in their discourse about the speech, have made clear how speech might be 
considered art: it must, according to Socrates, meet a high standard regarding 
knowledge: “[a] man must first know the truth about every single subject on which he 
speaks or writes.”  He goes on to give advice to  
Lysias and all the other prose writers, and Homer and all the other poets 
 who write to be recited or sung; and, in the third place Solon and all the 
 other writers who compose political tracts under the name of laws: ‘If 
 a man composes his work with the full knowledge of the truth and  can 
 come to the aid of what he has written when he is challenged and has the 
 power to demonstrate from his own mouth the poverty of his writings, he 
 ought not to be designated by a name drawn from them, but by one that 
 indicates his serious pursuits’ (278).    
According to Socrates, the appropriate title for someone like this is not rhetor or 
rhetorician but “lover of wisdom” (74, 278).  There is no question, then, about where 
Plato locates the ethos: it is in the person rather than in the moment of discourse.  If the 
rhetor’s purpose is truth, then he can do nothing but be the ethos he portrays.   
 
 28 
Though this discussion of Plato may seem to have meandered from our original 
question about ethos, it speaks directly to it.  In the theories of ethos constructed by key 
figures in the histories of rhetoric, we uncover a significant problem in working with 
ethos: the distinction between being of good character or seeming to be of good 
character.  While Cicero and Quintilian wrestled with this problem, they were unable to 
bring it explicitly to solid ground one way or the other.  In Plato, however, we find a 
rich view of ethos by examining his evolving discourses about rhetoric.  Although it has 
the power to deceive, to please, to create opinion and belief, rhetoric can be valued 
when it works toward the good, toward knowledge and justice, toward improving the 
soul.  Mediating between Plato and our other ancient thinkers, Isocrates’ view that 
rhetorical education itself and the desire to persuade move the student toward wisdom 
and good character demonstrates a faith in teachers and education that may appear 
overarching; still, it seems a reasonable solution to a deeply contested philosophical-
rhetorical question. 
 This view of ethos instruction, though it helps resolve the dilemma our other 
ancient rhetoricians presented, complicates it.  Constructing ethos for the moment of 
discourse and teaching ethos as a temporary construction would be far easier than 
dealing with lived character.  Because my interests are pedagogical, any theory of ethos 
has value for this project only if it can be applied in the classroom, but the Platonic view 
of ethos and the Isocratean faith in education raise the challenges and stakes of teaching 
ethos.  How can we balance the practicalities of twenty-first-century higher education 
and improvement of the soul?  Put more specifically, what does writing instruction have 
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to do with developing virtue and wisdom in students?   How can we possibly have the 
kind of faith in our and our students’ motives that Isocrates had in his?  Perhaps looking 
at how the ancients viewed rhetorical education is a place to begin. 
 One thing that unites our key figures—Isocrates, Aristotle, Quintilian, Cicero, 
and Plato—is that they were all interested in educating the next generation.  Aristotle, 
Isocrates, Plato, and Quintilian had their own schools; Cicero, though not a teacher per 
se, instructed through his orations, letters, and longer works such as De Inventione and 
De Oratore.  All these important rhetoricians wrote with the purpose of instructing, and 
they all viewed education as a significant step towards creating or improving the state.  
All saw training in philosophy or rhetoric or both as essential in the training of an 
effective citizenry, and what one might call “character development” figures into this 
training.   
 Although Isocrates had a school, a very successful and long-lived school, he 
taught through his speeches and writing as well.  His ethos is demonstrated most 
clearly, perhaps, through his pedagogical beliefs and practices.  He was, as Richard Leo 
Enos claims, “without question the most illustrious teacher of his day” (113).8  We can 
see his tendency toward teaching behaviors even as he presents his case in Antidosis, 
guiding his audience toward the reception of his speech: 
  But I urge all who intend to acquaint themselves with my speech, first, to 
  make allowance, as they listen to it, for the fact that it is a mixed  
  discourse, composed with an eye to all these subjects; next, to fix their 
                                                
8 Many other scholars, including Cheryl Glenn, Werner Jaeger, and H. I. Marrou also assert the primacy 
of teaching in Isocrates’ life. 
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 attention even more on what is about to be said than on what has been said 
 before; and lastly, not to seek to run  through the whole of it at the first sitting, 
 but only so much of it as will not fatigue the audience.  For if you comply with 
 this advice, you will be better able to determine whether I speak in a manner 
 worthy of my reputation. (12) 
In asking his audience to delay judgment (17) and to hear him “with good will” (28), he 
both instructs them in critical thinking and promotes his cause for exoneration. 
 Isocrates’ impulse toward educating others may be seen also when he relates to 
the audience his deliberations over what to include in his defense: one consideration for 
him was to incorporate “matter which it would be well for young men to hear before 
they set out to gain knowledge and an education” (10).  Ever aware that people are 
learning from his speech, he sets out to present valuable information; he also takes 
every opportunity to explain his points, digressing to elaborate on his thoughts.  Jaeger 
maintains that these digressions provide us with insight into his teaching of both content 
and form: “Fortunately for us, he often expressed his views of his art and of his 
educational ideals; he often seized an opportunity to break off the thread of his 
argument, and to explain what he was saying, how he was saying it, and why” (55).  
Through the digressions and the supplementary texts as well as through the main text of 
Antidosis, Isocrates keeps the audience mindful of both his character and his methods 
and the relationship between the two. 
 It is in defending the accusations against his teaching that Isocrates presents his 
educational theory and the strongest arguments for his ethics.  To the accusation that he 
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has corrupted young men, he responds that no one has ever been harmed by him, and, 
referring to Panegyricus, argues that instead he inpires young men “to a life of valour 
and of dangers endured for their countey” (Antidosis 60).  This conflation of patriotism 
and education takes us to the heart of Isocrates’ pedagogy, for it is through his teaching 
that he believes he can best assist Athens.  He believes that the health of the state is 
related directly to the quality of education (174); his goal is to make “better men” (185) 
so Athens will have able leaders and citizens.  Jaeger contends that “he wished to 
educate statesmen who could give new direction to the efforts of the misguided masses 
and to the politics of the Greek states [. . .]” (51-52).  For Isocrates, the key to such 
influence was the emphasis on values in his pedagogy.  He was convinced that 
cultivating the power of persuasion helps students to know the good and the bad, the 
just and the unjust; he says that “the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of 
a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward 
image of a good and faithful soul” (255).  Through his rhetorical education, then, he 
envisioned training young men toward the truth and justice necessary for their work as 
valuable and worthy citizens. 
 Antidosis allows us to examine Isocrates’ construction of his ethos, but if we 
adopt his view that “a man’s life is of more weight than that which is furnished by 
words,” we need to look outside his texts to evaluate his ethos, and we can do so by 
examining what scholars have determined about his contributions.  Repeatedly, in texts 
that reflect the scholarship on Isocrates, we can find references to the influence he had 
on rhetorical education (Glenn; Kennedy; Jaeger; Marrou; Welch).  The greatest 
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distinction bestowed on Isocrates by scholars, though, is that he established educational 
theories and practices maintained through the ensuing centuries, many of them still 
respected today.  Although Marrou says that naming him “Father of Humanism” 
overstates the case, he does assert that it was Isocrates, not Plato, who was responsible 
for the education of Greece in the fourth century, that he was indeed responsible for the 
emphasis on poetics in Western education (79-80), and that in addition to inspiring our 
pedagogical tradition of imitating literary models (84), Isocrates changed the face of 
oratory (81).  Other scholars agree that Isocrates had enormous influence on humanistic 
education,9 in part because of his emphasis on values.  Welch explains that the 
reputation of his school is better than the schools of other Sophists because of this 
emphasis on values (123), and Cheryl Glenn summarizes the connection among 
rhetoric, values, and patriotism in Isocrates’ influential theory of education: 
  [H]is confidence in the power of words was the wellspring of what  
  would become humanist scholarship.  He undertook to saturate his art 
  with a content of real values, for his eloquence had a distinct civic and 
  patriotic purpose, and his students were to be citizen-orators.  As such, 
  his sophistry, his educational system with its sound moral influence and 
  its rhetorical base, was a system of general culture. (35) 
In examining Isocrates’ ethos as presented through his own discourse and through his 
lingering reputation, we see a man with the kind of character he required of persuasive 
                                                
9 Richard Leo Enos refers to Isocrates as the “founder of humanism” (84), Werner Jaeger contends that “it 
is perfectly correct to describe him . . . as the father of ‘humanistic culture’” (46), and Kathleen Welch 
says the he is commonly known as “one of the founders of the liberal arts” (118). 
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rhetors.10  But the question remains: must a rhetor be or simply seem to be virtuous, 
trustworthy, credible?   The ancients repeatedly conflate the two despite their assertions 
that “the arguments made by a man’s life” (Antidosis 278), “the morals, principles, 
conduct, and lives of those who plead causes” (De Oratore II.43), and “excellences of 
character” (Institutio Oratoria I.9-10) are of prime importance in creating ethos.  
Underlying this emphasis on lived life is the assumption that audiences can know 
rhetors’ lives.  While it is possible that Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian might have 
known the speakers they heard, at least by reputation, such familiarity with rhetors’ 
lives is certainly less possible today.  But that does not make ancient conceptions of 
ethos unreasonable for us to include in composition instruction; determining the quality 
of a rhetor’s life was, for these ancient rhetoricians, far more complex than simply 
                                                
10 Examining Isocrates’ character from a twenty-first century perspective, however, complicates our 
reception of his ethos.  Several of his ideas signal warnings that his character may not be so widely 
accepted today as worthy of respect.  For one, it is difficult for some educators to accept his notion that 
“natural ability is paramount and comes before all else” (Antidosis 189).  Today, we have a more 
egalitarian attitude about what students must bring to the educational enterprise; Isocrates would have 
most assuredly refused education to students we regularly accept into academia.  This notion of the 
primacy of natural ability rests in the belief that certain rights are established by physis, that natural law 
determines and regulates, among other things, who can be educated.  We can observe in several of 
Isocrates’ attitudes his uninterrogated acceptance of the demarcations drawn by physis.  The absence of 
women in his texts, for example, is characteristic of this notion.  When we read in Isocrates about 
students, forefathers, and citizens, we know he means only men, and we know that he was writing for an 
audience of men.  The absence of women in his far-reaching texts indicates that within his idea of the 
polis, women were beneath regard, as was the cultural norm of his time.  Knowledge about women in 
Athens indicates that there were clear distinctions between the roles of men and women and that these 
distinctions were based on the assumed inferiority of women.  Both Sue Blundell and Sarah Pomeroy 
maintain that the primary value of women in ancient Greece was the production of citizens, that their 
chief role was to keep the state strong by providing legitimate heirs (Blundell 119; Pomeroy 60).  This 
relegation of women to the role of citizen procreation resulted in concern over their sexuality: to ensure 
that only citizens were produced, women had to be isolated from other possible sexual liaisons, hence 
their restriction to the home and the harsh penalties for adultery.  This certainly appears to be a political 
reason for the isolation of women, but like much political ideology, it is related to what is believed to be 
“true” and “natural.”   Today, this androcentrism and its accompanying misogyny seem not only out of 
date but wrongheaded, certainly not worthy of an ethos that is to be believed on other matters.   
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knowing him.  Indeed, their estimation of virtue was entwined with rhetorical 
education.   
To better understand this idea—that education improves character—we have to 
understand Greek education, its purpose and its place in Greek society, beginning with 
the Sophists, for, according to Werner Jaeger and H. I. Marrou, these teachers had 
enormous influence on the development of Greek education and on the idea that 
knowledge increased virtue.   Both Jaeger and Marrou relate the development of 
education to the shift from aristocracy to democracy and the city-state’s desire to have 
able leaders drawn from the citizenry.  Marrou explains that education and political life 
were interdependent, that the Sophists’ purpose was to train statesmen (50).  Likewise, 
Jaeger reports that the shift from aristocratic leadership to a new politics necessitated 
educating young men to become able citizen leaders with areté, or excellence.   Under 
the aristocracy, areté was believed to be transmitted through bloodlines; with the new 
city-state, however, a new way of training or discovering excellence was needed, and 
the Sophists provided the means—by educating Athens’ new leaders (Jaeger 286-90).  
So the Sophists served the state in their work to train new leaders and established the 
belief that areté could be developed through education rather than through bloodlines.  
Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and even Plato are heirs to that concept.  
Throughout Isocrates’ texts, we find evidence of his belief that education improves the 
man.  In Antidosis, he explains the value of training the body and the mind, of providing 




[Y]ou will find that among our public men who are living today or who have but 
lately passed away those who give most study to the art of words are the best of 
the statesmen who come before you on the rostrum,  and, furthermore, that 
among  the ancients it was the greatest and the most illustrious orators who 
brought to the city most of her blessings. (313) 
Here Isocrates is not referring to the ability to dazzle through public speech.  Instead, he 
sees the process of learning to speak well as the means by which people gain strong, 
good character.  For Isocrates, rhetorical education prepares worthy leaders because 
understanding and gaining control over discourse trains the mind toward excellence.  In 
the lengthy passage which follows, we can see Isocrates’ strong opinion that speech and 
wisdom are bound together: 
For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a 
former occasion, we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; 
nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other 
resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to 
persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, 
not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come 
together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, 
generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the 
power of speech has not helped us to establish [. . .] .  It is by this also 
that we confute the bad and extol the good.  Through this we educate the 
ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is taken as 
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the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true 
and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul.  
With this faculty we both contend against others on matters which are 
open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are 
unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others 
when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own 
thoughts; and, while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before 
a crowd, we regard as sage those who most skillfully debate their 
problems in their own minds.  And, if there is need to speak in brief 
summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are 
done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in 
all our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is 
most employed by those who have the most wisdom. (327-9) 
Marrou contends that, with Isocrates, rhetorical education became instruction in ethics 
and development of morality: “[According to Isocrates, an orator] will naturally be led 
to choose [. . .] subjects which are most in conformity with virtue.  Further still, he will 
necessarily be led to transmit the virtue of his words into his behaviour, his life; for the 
orator’s entire personality is embodied in his speeches [. . .]” (88-89).  So when we read 
Isocrates’ passage in Antidosis asserting that the “argument which is made by a man’s 
life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words [. . .] (278), we must 
understand that if the man demonstrates virtue in his life, it is most likely because he 
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has had training in oratory, that his understanding of and control over language derives 
from a process that has also improved his character. 
 Although it is common to posit philosophy and rhetoric against one another, 
especially in discussions of Plato, I argue that the rhetoricians we have considered here, 
even Plato, are united at base: the excellence of character required for persuasive 
rhetoric is developed through rhetorical education, through gaining knowledge—either 
through practicing dialectic or rehearsing excellent examples provided by the past.  As 
Kate Ronald aptly asserts in “A Reexamination of Personal and Public Discourse in 
Classical Rhetoric,” both rhetorical instruction and the classical conception of ethos  
worked in the spaces between personal and public life, go[ing] beyond 
 simply  persuading large crowds about matters of law and politics.  It is 
 possible, I think, to argue that classical pedagogy was fundamentally 
 concerned with the student’s  mind at work, and the student’s ability to 
 see rhetoric as a way of learning, thinking, and acting in the world.  In 
 other words, classical rhetoric taught individual, intellectual 
 responsibility, not simply through the imitation of received  wisdom, nor 
 with the sole aim of improving the polity. (37-38) 
And I have to assume that contemporary teachers of composition and rhetoric hold to 
this same view, that our work can assist our students in gaining knowledge and skills 
that result in their becoming more responsible, more critical in their thinking.  This 
strengthening of knowledge and intellectual responsibility most definitely supports 
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understanding the value of ethos and its development and can even, I dare to say, 
improve the lived lives of our students. 
   
Ethos in Contemporary Composition and Rhetoric Instruction 
 The character of the rhetor was indeed an issue in classical rhetoric, and 
teaching it was at the center of education towards participation in the politics and 
government of Athens.  With the renewed interest in classical rhetoric during the late 
twentieth century and with the scholarship that contributed to composition theory, we 
might expect that these recent appropriations of classical rhetoric in composition 
pedagogy would include a concern for the character of the rhetor.  But we would be 
mistaken.  While there has been renewed interest in many elements of classical rhetoric, 
especially in Aristotle’s system, attention to ethos has resurfaced only minimally11.  As 
pointed out earlier in this chapter, we find mention of ethos in some composition and 
rhetoric textbooks, but aside from those discussed in that passage, more than a brief 
mention of ethos in current books for undergraduate students is difficult to find.   
 A primary impetus driving my current project is my contention that ethos is not 
being adequately presented to composition students but should be.  Supporting that 
claim, however, is difficult, for demonstrating absence of anything, specifically in this 
case an absence  of instruction, is a challenge, especially when referring to how a 
particular piece of rhetoric is not included in composition classes throughout the United 
States.  At the onset of this project, I had a strong sense, based on my experience 
                                                
11 Although composition pedagogy has not taken up or revived ethos, there has been some theoretical 
activity in recent years, most notably James S. and Tita French Baumlin’s collection Ethos: New Essays 
in Rhetorical and Critical Theory (Dallas: SMU Press, 1994) 
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teaching, reading the literature of the field, attending conferences, participating in 
online discussions, being fully in the discipline, that ethos was for the most part ignored 
in composition and rhetoric classrooms.  To determine if my perceptions were 
reasonable, I examined three sites likely to provide a more solid sense of whether ethos 
is part of composition instruction in the U. S. today.  First, I gathered information about 
textbook use.12  In addition, I examined the April 2000 Writing Program Administrators 
Outcomes Statement for First-Year Composition.  Finally, I investigated fourteen years 
of archives of the WPA-L (listserv for the Council of Writing Program Administrators) 
to find references to ethos.  Although any one of these pieces of my research would 
alone be suspect, the triangulation of the three provides a strong indicator of materials 
available to composition administrators and instructors and, more important, the 
concerns they seem to have in their deliberations of the composition and rhetoric 
curriculum. 
 Data from MIR provided by Bedford/St. Martin’s included the top-selling 
textbooks for 2005 in each of four categories: rhetoric textbooks, rhetorical readers, 
                                                
12 There are two problems with this part of my research:  first, connecting textbook adoption to course 
outcomes and classroom practices is unreasonable.  Textbooks do not, should not, drive course 
objectives, nor is there any reliable way to determine, without a large survey of the population of 
composition instructors, how or if adopted textbooks are used.  Determining how ethos is addressed in 
composition courses by looking at widely adopted textbooks would not provide the information I needed.  
It could be only one piece of the project.  The second problem is that getting information about textbook 
adoptions can be expensive—either in dollars or in time.  Data are not readily available through the 
standard lines of research.  Checking publisher and retail websites for information about top sellers, 
wading through many college, university, and individual professor websites to find references to 
composition textbooks used in their classes, and searching for data from previous studies armed me with 
mounds of data that added up to nothing solid.  Finally, I was able to obtain the 2005 College Textbook 
National Market Report by Monument Information Resource (MIR) from Bedford/St. Martin’s.  I greatly 






complete handbooks, and brief handbooks.  Table 1 includes the top three textbooks 
adopted for each category.  As you can see, these data do not include textbooks 
focusing on argument and persuasion, so I visited Faculty Online, a site reporting some 
MIR data about “top sellers” for faculty to use in selecting textbooks.  This site provides 
a list, from a sample of 1200 schools, of higher education faculty using specific texts.  
There are problems with these data, however: although the sample number is given 
(1200 schools), there is no indication how the sample was attained, nor is there 
information about which or what type of schools were polled; some titles are listed 
more than once with no indication of why or what the difference might be between the 
two (different edition, complete or short version, etc.); there is no information about 
how data were collected and no information about date or duration of data collection.  
Still, the information on the site does give an indication of the argument textbooks most 
widely sold, which indicates the ones with the highest adoption numbers. 
 Clearly my investigations of textbooks used in composition and rhetoric courses 
are not scientific; they are, indeed, limited.  They do, however, provide a probability of 
what is available to composition students and what their instructors are adopting for use 
in their courses.  I examined the following textbooks for their treatment of ethos: 
• Axelrod and Cooper’s The St. Martin’s Guide to Writing, 7th –the top selling 
“rhetoric” 
• Kriszner’s Patterns for College Writing: A Rhetorical Reader, 9th—the top-
selling “rhetorical reader” 
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• Fowler and Aaron’s The Little, Brown Handbook, 9th—the top-selling complete 
handbook 
• Hacker’s A Writer’s Reference, 5th—the top-selling brief handbook 
• Hacker’s The Bedford Handbook, 6th 
• Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters’ Everything’s an Argument, 4th—the top-
selling argument textbook 
• Ramage and Bean’s Writing Arguments, 6th 
• Barnet and Bedau’s Current Issues and Enduring Questions, 7th 
In searching these textbooks for concepts that approximate ethos, I did not limit target 
keywords to “ethos” but included other terms that sometimes stand in for it.  As Nan 
Johnson points out in “Ethos and the Aims of Rhetoric,” current texts refer to “’tone, 
‘writer’s voice,’ ‘personal appeal,’ ‘attitude,’ ‘persona,’ and ‘credibility’” rather than 
the Greek term (112).  Following her lead, then, I included those six terms in my search, 
plus I added another, “authority.”   After examining the table of contents for each book 
to discern specific chapters that would be likely to include instruction, information, or 
activities related to presentation of the writer’s character, I checked the index for 
references to each of the terms listed above.  The results of this search were interesting 
but, for the most part, not surprising.  I expected to find few references to anything 
approximating ethos in the handbooks, and this proved to be the case, with one 
exception.   
Fowler and Aaron’s The Little, Brown Handbook provides students with a 
surprising number—far more than the other handbooks—of opportunities to at least 
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read about giving attention to how they portray their characters in their writing.  The 
term “ethos” is never used, but Fowler and Aaron do include several passages on ethical 
appeals. Early in the text, in a section on audience, they provide “three key elements” 
that contribute to “pitching your writing to your audience.”  The list includes the 
following advice: “The role you choose to play in relation to your readers. Depending 
on your purpose and your attitude toward your topic, you will want readers to perceive 
you in a certain way.  The possible roles are many and varied—for instance, scholar, 
storyteller, lecturer, guide, reported, advocate, inspirer” (11).  This presentation is not 
problematized and is presented simply and briefly without further discussion. While this 
is certainly not a full discussion of the role of ethos in writing, it does introduce the idea 
that the writer’s presentation of self, even if it is conceptualized as a “role,” can be a 
significant contribution to writer-reader interaction.   
 Like many other writers of handbooks and textbooks, Fowler and Aaron include 
discussions of “tone,”  but their presentation addresses more than others: they go 
beyond saying simply that tone should be appropriate, pointing out that “[t]one is the 
expression of the writer’s attitudes toward himself or herself, toward the subject, and 
toward the reader [. . .] .  Tone can tell you quite a bit about the writer’s intentions, 
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about how the specific writer’s tone is conveyed through word choice, a brief but 
excellent example of creating and deciphering tone. 
Later in the book, in their chapter on writing argument, Fowler and Aaron 
present rational, emotional, and ethical appeals, explaining that an ethical appeal is “the 
sense you give of being a competent, fair, trustworthy person” (173).  They instruct 
their readers that this sense can be created by presenting a sound argument, 
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acknowledging the opposition, demonstrating shared beliefs, and by avoiding language 
that is insulting or biased.  Interestingly enough, they also point out that correctness in 
grammar, spelling, and sentence structure demonstrates competence.   
Fowler and Aaron’s instructions on reading critically include a passage about 
authority and how it is achieved differently in different cultures.  They say that in the 
United States “authority tends to derive from study, learning, and experience: the more 
knowledge a person can demonstrate about a subject, the more authority he or she has” 
(148).    Further instruction related to the concept of ethos is presented in several other 
passages in the book: using electronic mail, writing a business memo, questions for 
literary analysis, evaluating sources, and inappropriate appeals.  Although I would not 
say Fowler and Aaron have given a full treatment to ethos, their inclusion of concepts 
important and related to understanding and constructing ethos exceeds other handbooks 
in number, frequency, and in depth of conceptualization. 
Diana Hacker’s two top-selling handbooks, A Writer’s Reference and The 
Bedford Handbook, approach ethos in different ways and to different degrees.  A 
Writer’s Reference includes only one passage that refers to anything approaching ethos.  
In “Constructing Reasonable Arguments,” the text focuses on (1) subject matter and 
context, (2) audience, and (3) writing an introduction that establishes credibility.  
Hacker writes, “In your introduction, establish credibility and state your thesis” (39).  
Here she explains that writers should establish credibility “[i]n the sentences leading up 
to the thesis [. . .]” (39) and includes a student-written paragraph to demonstrate how 
the writer “presents himself as someone worth listening to” by showing his knowledge, 
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his fair-mindedness, and the values he likely shares with his audience.  Nowhere else in 
this handbook is there a reference to persona, voice, tone, or appeals. 
 The Bedford Handbook, however, provides teachers and students with more 
opportunities to think about such matters.  In this text, Hacker includes passages on 
tone, credibility, and appeals to emotion.  She refers to tone in three chapters: one on 
the writing process, one on document design, and one on MLA style, pointing out the 
importance of an appropriate tone in writing tasks from electronic communication to 
research papers.  A basic but valuable opportunity for teachers and students to work 
with ethos can be found in Hacker’s chapter on the writing process, where she includes 
a section on audience, explaining that “[t]he tone of a piece of writing expresses the 
writer’s feelings toward the audience, so it is important to get it right.  If the tone seems 
too self-centered—or too flippant, stuffy, bossy, patronizing, opinionated, or hostile—
obviously it should be modified” (53, 56).  She goes on to provide an example of 
student writing in which tone is improved through revising. 
 The passage in The Bedford Handbook on credibility is the same text as Hacker 
includes in A Writer’s Reference, where she explains that credibility should be 
established in the sentences leading up to a thesis statement (494-495).  In her chapter 
on critical thinking, though, Hacker addresses credibility through a discussion of 
evaluating emotional appeals in arguments.  Clearly, the topic here is pathos, which she 
names, but the text opens the door to ethos because of Hacker’s focus on the writer, on 
how fair he or she seems.   
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 Not surprisingly, handbooks provide minimal opportunity to teach and learn 
ethos.  Unfortunately, the textbooks commonly known as “rhetorics” fare little better.  
Perhaps the most disappointing presentation of anything that could be called ethos or 
one of its stand-ins was in Axelrod and Cooper’s The St. Martin’s Guide to Writing, 7th.   
Concepts related to ethos are presented in this textbook as either “credibility” or 
“authority.”  This text disappoints in its vague and sometimes circular explanations of 
the terms.  For example, some of the statements are beyond useless, almost laughable: 
“Authorities are people to whom the writer attributes expertise on a given subject,” “the 
believability of authorities depends on their credibility, on whether the reader accepts 
them as experts on the topic at hand” (605), and “authorities [. . .] must be 
authoritative—that is, trustworthy and reputable” (684).  Although some of these 
“explanations” of the concepts are followed by interesting exercises or reminders, such 
as to pay attention to the writer’s ideology and purposes (504-505), few are preceded by 
adequate instruction.  One, for example, asks students to analyze how authorities are 
used in specific passages, all of which are isolated paragraphs in various essays.  The 
amazing part of this assignment, though, is that it does not recommend a careful 
reading; instead, a parenthetical comment ends the assignment—“If you have not read 
the essays, take time to read or skim them” (685).  One must wonder how much serious 
analysis can take place with such limited engagement with the texts.  The result is the 
sense that even Axelrod and Cooper do not take these exercises—or the learning that 
should come from them—seriously. 
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 As we might expect, textbooks that focus on argument provide more 
opportunities for learning about ethos.  All three of the argument texts that I 
examined—Ramage and Bean’s Writing Arguments; Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and 
Walters’ Everything’s an Argument; and Barnet and Bedau’s Current Issues and 
Enduring Questions—treat ethos as a significant element of argument.  Each text 
presents ethos as more than tone, more substantial than credibility, and more complex 
than a technique to use in appealing to an audience.  Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and 
Walters, for example, include a chapter about ethos, “Arguments Based on Character,” 
which opens with the example of John Kerry saluting as he accepted the nomination at 
the Democratic National Convention in 2004.  They explain that by saluting, Kerry 
“was making an argument based on character, or ethos—the presentation of self that a 
writer or speaker brings to an argument” (61).  A thorough discussion follows, asserting 
that individuals, groups, and organizations have ethos and that “[a]udiences clearly pay 
attention to ethos” (61).   Throughout this discussion, the writers of this textbook 
include references to “self” and “identity,” affirming that ethos is more than a mask or a 
tone of voice that writers put on for the moment of discourse.  Although this text 
addresses how ethos is created for discourse, it is not a brief description of where 
credibility can be inserted into a text or an exhortation to befriend the audience.  
Instead, Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters invite students to explore ethos carefully 
through the explanations presented in the text as well as through exercises and 
assignments.  One exercise asks students to create a visual display that demonstrates an 
ethical argument.  Another suggests that they “analyze the ethos of the authors and 
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editors of Everything’s an Argument as they reveal themselves in this particular 
chapter” (75) by looking at language, examples, images, political and cultural attitudes, 
and it presses students to go beyond that analysis, asking them think about what they 
have discovered: “Does the chapter suggest a coherent ethos, or do you find 
inconsistencies that surprise or confuse you?  Write a page describing the ethos and the 
appeal it does or doesn’t have for you, being sure to offer specific evidence for your 
claims” (75).  Finally, the chapter ends with a series of suggested exercises, all of them 
leading students to have a solid understanding of ethos and how it might be evidenced.  
In one exercise, students are asked to look carefully at public figures and how they 
might be persuasive in specific arguments; in another they are asked to rewrite some 
passages, giving attention to use of first-person pronouns, the way authority is claimed, 
credibility established, and competence demonstrated; in others they are encouraged to 
create images or ads with ethos in mind (76-77).   
 In addition to the chapter on ethos, the concept appears in the chapter “Thinking 
Rhetorically,” which includes a sample paragraph with annotation about ethos, a 
chapter on fallacies, one on appealing to audiences, and one on visual arguments.  An 
interesting inclusion in this textbook, the section “Visual Arguments Based on 
Character” explores what appearances say: “the point is that the visual rhetoric of any 
piece you create ought to be a deliberate choice, not an accident.  Also keep control of 
your own visual image.  In most cases, when you present an argument, you want to 
appear authoritative and credible” (424). The advice does not end there, however; 
students can also begin to think about subtle ways ethos can be created: “Consider how 
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design reflects your character” with attention to fonts, size of type, color, images, 
medium (425-426).  Such attention to subtlety could be valuable in pressing students to 
think of ethos on multiple levels and in a variety of contexts.   Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, 
and Walters’ presentation of ethos challenges students to understand it as it is used by 
other writers and speakers, to work with it as they do their own writing, and to be aware 
of it in their visual experience. 
 A more traditional approach to argument appears in Barnet and Bedau’s Current 
Issues and Enduring Questions, and their presentation of ethos is explicitly Aristotelian.  
Although the approach to ethos in this textbook is not simplistic, it lacks attention to the 
subtleties included in Everything’s an Argument.  Because this text is more traditional, 
the focus is on written arguments rather than the wide range of persuasion that 
Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters address.  They never use language such as 
“identity” or even “character” in their explanations but approach ethos as a “suggestion” 
of intelligence, benevolence and honesty that writers convey through their discourse 
(238).  With a nod to the distinction between—or conflation of—being and seeming, 
Barnet and Bedau insert that “[a]s the Roman proverb puts it, ‘No one gives what he 
does not have.’ Still possession of these qualities is not a guarantee that you will convey 
them in your writing” (238).   In a further explanation of what they call the “writer’s 
persona,” they define it as “the way in which the writer presents his or her attitudes 
toward the self, [. . .] the audience, and [. . .] the subject” (239).  Perhaps the most 
interesting and surprising twist in conceptualizing character appears in the section 
“Thinking about the Effects of Literature,” where the authors emphasize the 
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significance literature can have on individual lives.  While their discussions of 
rhetorical character suggest it is only a surface feature and leave readers with a pallid 
and flat notion of character, in the section on literature, “character” takes on flesh and 
blood.  Barnet and Bedau weave literature and character together, acknowledging the 
depth to which readers’ selves are implicated in the literary transaction:  
[A]lthough we may try to engage in [. . .] analysis as dispassionately as 
 possible, we all know that inevitably we are not only examining 
 something out there, but are also examining our own responses.  Why? 
 Because literature has an effect on us [. . .].  What about the 
 consequences of the effects of literature?  Does literature shape our 
 character and therefore influence our behavior? It is generally 
 believed that it does have an effect. (489-490)    
Clearly, character is a concern of the authors of this text; still, aside from pointing out 
that it is important, Barnet and Bedau do little to assist students in their practice of 
creating persuasive character. 
 My investigation of first-year composition textbooks—handbooks, rhetorics, 
and argument texts—suggests that while ethos is addressed in some widely used books, 
scaffolding for instruction is flimsy.  Instructors without an interest in helping their 
students understand the complexities and relevance of ethos in persuasive discourse 
would not be likely to address it, much less to assist their students in thinking about the 
power ethos wields over readers and writers or to help them understand how they are 
presenting themselves as they compose.  Of course, textbook examination can reflect 
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what takes place in classrooms only minimally.  To gain a more complete view of what 
guides composition courses, I examined the WPA Outcomes Statement for First-Year 
Composition, developed and adopted by the Council of Writing Program 
Administrators, April 2000. 
 This document (provided in its entirety in Appendix A) is divided into five 
sections: “Introduction,” “Rhetorical Knowledge,” “Critical Thinking, Reading, and 
Writing,” “Processes,” and “Knowledge of Conventions.”  The document is intended to 
“[describe] the common knowledge, skills, and attitudes sought by first-year 
composition programs in American postsecondary education [. . .] and to [articulate] 
what composition teachers nationwide have learned from practice, research, and 
theory.”   If we accept that this document does indeed articulate common knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes and reflects the practice, research, and theory of teachers, then we 
can surmise that ethos is not a pedagogical concern.  In the section on rhetorical 
knowledge, where we would most likely find references to ethos, there are only two 
opportunities to include it in planning learning outcomes.  The statement asserts that 
“[b]y the end of first year composition, students should [. . .] respond to the needs of 
different audiences [and] adopt appropriate voice, tone, and level of formality [. . .].”  
As we have seen before, rather than mention of the term ethos itself, the focus is on its 
stand-ins, voice and tone.   
 Most certainly, the outcomes statement does not in any way limit what 
instructors do in their course designs or classroom activities; it does, however, provide 
guidance for valuing specific pedagogical emphases.  And outcomes related to 
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understanding or constructing ethos are absent.  To further understand teachers’ 
concerns and interests regarding ethos, I turned to the Writing Program Administrator 
Listserve (WPA-L) archives to find references to ethos and its stand-ins, voice, tone, 
and character.  Aside from one lengthy string, “Onward Ethos,” (and alternatively in 
some subject lines “Ethos, Logos, Pathos”) from February 25 through March 3, 2001, 
the topic is not raised.  In this particular string, however, seventeen participants address 
significant issues related to ethos.  This lively exchange includes references to 
textbooks and scholarly essays where ethos is treated; discussions of rhetorical theory 
related to ethos that complicate and deepen the thread; personal comments and 
reflections on the contributors’ own constructions and understandings of ethos; and 
references to instructional activities used in classrooms toward helping students 
understand and work with ethos.  This online discussion indicates at least briefly a 
greater interest in teaching ethos than evidenced by current textbooks or the WPA 
Outcomes Statement for First-Year Composition.   Clearly, the people involved in this 
conversation consider instruction in ethos significant in teaching and learning 
composition.  Still, uncovering only this one lengthy thread in the WPA-L archives 
suggests that such an interest is not widespread.  
 If instruction in ethos is a way teachers of composition and rhetoric can improve 
the effectiveness of their students’ thinking and discourse and assist them in developing 
intellectual responsibility, it would seem an important focus in their course designs and 
classroom activities, yet my investigations have led me to conclude that such instruction 
is little valued or practiced.  In the next chapter, I suggest reasons for this omission.  
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Chapter 2:  Ethos in First-Year Composition 
 
 Efforts to shape composition pedagogy can confound at times: the field is so 
rich and varied that the means for reaching outcomes, even generally agreed upon 
outcomes, can take many paths.  My claim that ethos should be included in teaching 
composition and rhetoric is only one suggestion among many.  For me, it is a useful and 
focused way to approach key concepts and ways of thinking about writing, but the 
reasons other teacher-theorists have not lobbied for its inclusion are not difficult to 
discern.  Theorizing ethos presents challenges, primarily in the context of the culture 
within which we and our students reside and its disciplining sensibilities, far different 
from the cultural sensibilities that disciplined ancient rhetoric. 
As we have seen in examining how our five ancient rhetoricians conceived of 
ethos, a crucial concern centered on values, specifically how one might determine what 
is Good and True.  In the intervening twenty-five hundred years, humans have 
continued to puzzle over whether we can trust in “ultimates,” and, if so, what they are.  
One challenge of theorizing ethos relates directly to the complexity of shifting values 
and locations of values.  As Nan Johnson points out, the study of rhetoric, because of its 
sensitivity to culture, must be a study of various conceptions of language, people, and 
culture.  She suggests that learning how ethos is understood in a particular time 
necessitates investigating what constitutes the Good and the True in that time (99).  The 
construction and effectiveness of a rhetor’s ethos is of necessity related to the agreed 
upon values of the culture: a persuasive ethos requires both the rhetor and the audience 
to have a common understanding of what constitutes the moral and immoral, the just 
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and unjust.  Following Johnson’s lead, then, one move toward understanding how to 
situate ethos today is to determine the Good and the True in contemporary contexts.   
 
Postmodern Sensibilities and The Good, the True, the Self 
 We can look to theories of postmodernism to help us understand contemporary 
sensibilities.  Though theories of postmodernity, postmodernism, and the postmodern 
are complex, in the interest in time and space for this current rhetorical situation, I 
summarize and, of necessity, reduce: rather than elaborating on and complicating the 
wealth of commentary on postmodern theory, my current task is to extract qualities of 
postmodern experience and thought that are frequently recited as characteristic. To do 
so, I turn to four specific resources which provide excellent general discussions about 
the characteristics of postmodern thought and experience: Ihab Hassan’s The 
Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture, David Harvey’s The 
Condition of Postmodernity, Henry Giroux’s Border Crossings: Cultural Workers and 
the Politics of Education, and Lester Faigley’s Fragments of Rationality: Postmodernity 
and the Subject of Composition. 
 Referencing multiple writers (among them Kurt Godel, Thomas Kuhn, Paul 
Feyeraband,  Mikhail Bakhtin, Roland Barthes, Wolfgang Iser, Paul de Man, Stanley 
Fish, Norman Holland, Jacques Derrida, David Bleich, Jean-Francois Lyotard), Hassan 
lists what he calls his “catena”—for our purposes here, a list of eleven keywords that 
outline the characteristics of postmodernism: indeterminacy, fragmentation, 
decanonization, selflessness (a vacating of the traditional self), unpresentability and 
 
 56 
unrepresentability, irony, hybridization, carnivalization, performance and participation, 
constructionism, immanence (170-174).  Both Hassan and Harvey make clear that 
modernism and postmodernism share traits, that the two cannot be distinguished solely 
by difference in characteristics but by difference in how those characteristics are 
received or communicated.  While Harvey identifies fragmentation, ephemerality, 
chaotic change, transitoriness, and lack of historical continuity as characteristics of both 
modern and postmodern constructs of culture, he points out that the difference lies in 
the acceptance of such notions by postmodern thinkers in contrast to the modernist view 
that these are characteristics against which to struggle.  He argues that postmodern 
sensibility can be characterized by “its total acceptance of the ephemerality, 
fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic [. . .].  It does not try to transcend it, 
counteract it, or even to define the ‘eternal and immutable’ elements that might lie 
within it.  Postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic 
currents of change as if that is all there is” (44).  The postmodern approach is to relax 
into the characteristics the modernist sensibility found frightening or abhorrent. 
 In his analysis of modernism and postmodernism, Giroux makes three points 
that can contribute significantly to our understanding of their complex relationship.  He 
argues that definitions of modernism are subject to debate: “Not only is there a 
disagreement regarding the periodisation of the term, there is enormous controversy 
regarding to what it actually refers” (43).  In elaborating on the conditions of 
modernism, he claims that certain elements of modernism have led to political change 
in both the West and other parts of the world.  While struggles for equality and justice 
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have taken place on major fronts in other parts of the world, such as in Eastern Europe, 
they have moved to smaller fronts in the United States: “in the United States these are 
events that take place on the margins of civilization, related but not central to the 
political and cultural identity of the West except as mimesis” (41).   Giroux sees these 
political moves as indication of “the exhaustion of those hierarchical and undemocratic 
features of modernism that produce state oppression, managerial domination, and social 
alienation [. . .]” (41).  Despite the oppressive features of modernism, though, Giroux 
points to elements which have provided a legacy of possibility:  
In general terms, the political project of modernism is rooted in the 
 capacity of individuals to be moved by human suffering so as to 
 remove its causes, to give meaning to the principles of equality, 
 liberty, and justice; and to increase those social forms that enable 
 human beings to develop those capacities needed to  overcome ideologies 
 and material forms that legitimate and are embedded in relations of 
 domination. (Border Crossings 46) 
Giroux’s insights challenge the impulse to reduce modernism or postmodernism to a list 
of characteristics.  While he suggests, along with other theorists, that modernism does 
promote the European model of culture and thought and its attending elements “that 
represent the worst legacies of the Enlightenment tradition” (39), such as the emphasis 
on universality and the unified subject, he also defends elements of modernism that 
contribute to democratization and equality and explains postmodernism in relation to 
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the creations of modernism.  Because his explanation of the rich interplay between 
modernist results and postmodern possibilities is valuable, I quote at length: 
  As a discourse of plurality, difference, and multinarratives,   
  postmodernism resists being inscribed in any single articulating principle 
  in order to explain either the mechanics of domination or the dynamic of 
  emancipation [. . .].  The value of postmodernism lies in its role as a 
  shifting signifier that both reflects and contributes to the unstable cultural 
  and structural relationships that increasingly  characterize the advanced 
  industrial countries of the West.  The important point here is not whether 
  postmodernism can be defined within the parameters of particular  
  politics, but how its best insights might be appropriated within a  
  progressive and emancipatory democratic politics. 
I want to argue that while postmodernism does not suggest  
 particular ordering principle for defining a particular political project, it 
 does have a rudimentary coherence [. . .].  Postmodernism raises  
 questions and problems so as  to redraw and re-present the boundaries of 
 discourse and cultural criticism.  The issues that postmodernism has 
 brought into view can be seen, in part, through its various refusals of all 
 ‘natural laws’ and transcendental claims that by definition attempt to 
 ‘escape’ from any type of historical and normative grounding.  In fact, 
 if there is any underlying harmony to various discourses of 
 postmodernism it is in their rejection of absolute essences. (51) 
 
 59 
Giroux’s reading of postmodernism focuses on the large scale and on the abstract.  We 
must, however, also consider the effects of postmodernism on the quotidian, especially 
as it relates to our students and their lived experience. 
For a glimpse of this postmodern world our students inhabit, I turn to Lester 
Faigley, who interrogates Jean Baudrillard to gain insights into the writing of college 
students.  Despite criticism leveled against Baudrillard for his nihilism, Faigley finds 
him particularly enlightening because “students often sound very much like him” (212).  
So what does Baudrillard sound like?  Like someone who understands the world to be 
fragmented and irrational, someone who, as Faigley says, “describes the United States 
as the center of what he calls ‘hyperreality,’ a condition where images, signs, and codes 
no longer represent reality but in effect constitute reality, becoming ‘more real than 
real’” (164).  Baudrillard sounds like someone who has watched the evening news, 
MTV, flipped through hundreds of cable channels, and met avatars on Second Life.  He 
sounds like someone who has experienced New York, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas, like 
someone who has listened to talk radio, ten second commercials, rap and rock, read 
bumper stickers and tee shirt slogans.  Our students have lived with this hyperreality 
most of their lives, watching “reality shows” on television, playing video games that 
increasingly appear “real,” taking care of virtual pets, building virtual communities, 
even living virtual lives online.   
 Baudrillard finds that everything in our culture ridiculously mimics various 
elements of the past, that we paste disparate elements together into a ragged pastiche.  
Faigley characterizes Baudrillard’s view of our place in the world:  “Since we are at the 
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end of history, or as Baudrillard later qualified this statement, at the end of being able to 
talk about history, there is nothing left to do but ‘play with the pieces’ of the 
deconstructed universe” (210)—a disturbing image but one that touches the truth of 
what our students see enacted in the world, of how they themselves act in the world, a 
world whose chief characteristic is fragmentation rather than a sense of wholeness.  
Faigley’s text was published in 1992, long before we saw the Balkanization of Eastern 
Europe and Western Asia, long before the wars that continue today, before the Internet 
became a staple in middle-class homes in the United States, before college students 
created and re-created themselves on facebook.com and myspace.com.  His explication 
of the postmodern world à la Baudrillard, however, was prescient.  The only difference 
today is perhaps in intensity: we have more images, more sites for images, more pieces 
to play with.  And college students today are adept at playing with pieces.  Their 
popular music includes sampling, putting pieces of existing recordings together to 
create new ones, and assembling mixes and playlists from existing recordings on their 
iPods.  Personal web sites are pastiches of images and sounds their creators assemble, 
and both MySpace and Facebook facilitate uploading of photos, videos, and music to 
individuals’ profiles, providing multiple opportunities for users to assemble disparate 
pieces of information about themselves—favorite music and movies, biographical 
information, status updates (what they’re doing at the moment), links to favorite 
websites, and bulletins about events or a change in mood.   The pieces available for play 
have increased exponentially and become more accessible to the general population 
than Baudrillard may have imagined. 
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Since 2001, Beloit College has annually published its Mindset List, a 
compilation of specific cultural and historical details that characterizes the world first-
year college students have experienced.  A selection of items from recent lists (2005 – 
2008) includes items that underscore the ever present media and the resulting 
hyperreality in current college students’ lives:   
• They may have fallen asleep playing with their Gameboys in the crib. 
• They have always been challenged to distinguish between news and 
entertainment on cable TV. 
• Reality shows have always been on television. 
• They have always been able to watch wars and revolutions live on television. 
• They grew up with virtual pets to feed, water, and play games with, lest they die. 
• Thanks to MySpace and Facebook, autobiography can happen in real time. 
• They learned about JFK from Oliver Stone and Malcolm X from Spike Lee. 
• High definition television has always been available. 
• Virtual reality has always been available when the real thing failed. 
• They get much more information from Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert than 
from the newspaper. 
• Avatars have nothing to do with Hindu deities. 
• The World Wide Web has been an online tool since they were born. (Beloit 
College Mindset List http://www.beloit.edu/mindset/2012.php) 
 Another text pointedly prescient of the world in 2008 is Henry Giroux’s 1994 
essay “Slacking Off: Border Youth and Postmodern Education,” where he sketches the 
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world in which American youth live, a world with new population structures created by 
immigration, a world with a new economy based on shifting employment and massive 
unemployment, and he outlines the results: 
a general loss of faith in the modernist narratives of work and 
 emancipation; the recognition that the indeterminacy of the future 
 warrants confronting and living in the immediacy of experience; an 
 acknowledgment that homelessness as a condition of randomness has 
 replaced the security, if not misrepresentation, of home as a source of 
 comfort and security; an experience of time and space as  
 compressed and fragmented within a world of images that increasingly 
 undermine the dialectic of authenticity and universalism [. . .]. 
 (“Slacking Off” 8-9) 
 Baudrillard and Giroux provide for us a troubling but relevant view of life in our 
world, the world that our students interact with daily.  If we agree with many theorists 
of both modern and postmodern culture that reality is a social construct, then we 
understand the impact of such a culture on thinking, and we can project that people 
living in such a world have a tendency to develop a sense that truth is relative and 
ephemeral, that nothing connects to anything else; they live without the sense of 
wholeness created by cultures that have truths to hold to and fewer choices.  Young 
people today grow accustomed to operating and, thus, thinking within a fragmented 
world and to experiencing themselves as bits and pieces of identities they create as they 
participate in the multiple discourses of that world.  
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 Following Nan Johnson’s lead in locating the conception of ethos within a 
cultural context, we can project that, because the postmodern sensibility does not 
include central values or a universalized notion of the Good and True, rhetoric cannot 
be a means by which people can be trained to “think right” as Isocrates planned.  In the 
absence of universally or even a narrower culturally acknowledged virtue, rhetoric 
cannot render its practitioners excellent in character, certainly not in the classical sense.  
The ethos of the postmodern rhetor, then, must be understood in terms of the 
fragmentation and chaos of contemporary life and thought.   
 In a world conceived of as ephemeral, fragmented, discontinuous, and chaotic, 
attempting to pin down a stable and lasting notion of what is Good or Real or True 
could be little more than masochistic exercise.  With nothing whole or lasting, the 
possibility of establishing any immutable Good or Truth is impossible.  Indeed, the 
attempt is antithetical to postmodernism.  Harvey asserts that “[t]here is, in 
postmodernism, little overt attempt to sustain continuity of values, beliefs, or even 
disbeliefs” (56).  So if rhetoric is sensitive to culture, and the culture in which we live 
functions within postmodern sensibilities, then rhetoric today operates within a system 
absent notions of universal or eternal Truth.  Of course, remnants of the struggle to 
maintain a modernist faith in a universalized Truth remain, both in our culture at large 
and in composition pedagogy.  This could explain, at least in part, how images of virtue 
have such power in our culture, how people can be willingly taken in by the appearance 
of morality without interrogating it, how the public seems to value even unsupported 
representations of character in both politics and popular culture.  It does not require a 
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great leap of imagination to understand why, when our students’ experience of the 
world tends to “feel” postmodern—with its pluralisms, skepticisms, fragmentations, its 
multiplicity of images and texts—they might cling to belief in a stability that cannot be 
supported.  In our resistance to the psychic difficulties of postmodern life, we and our 
students may create classrooms feebly disciplined by modernist ideas and texts that 
none of us can believe in.  Though we may at times yearn for the stability of universal 
and eternal Truth and unitary selves, we know better, and as we work with students as 
rhetors, we can see and feel and know the futility of specifying what makes a 
character—an ethos—good or true.  Discerning effective ways to address ethos, ways 
we can believe in, can confound. 
 Further complicating the situation of ethos in contemporary culture are related 
conceptions of the self and subjectivity.  Clearly, valuing instruction in ethos implies 
that there is a character, a self,14 to be had, yet the postmodern view of the world posits 
a conception of self far different from the one which has dominated Western thought 
since the Enlightenment.  Rather than being characterized as unitary, autonomous, the 
postmodern self is seen as fragmented, multiple, and fluid. In Narrative Identities, 
George Yancey ruminates in a very personal way on the disciplinary function of 
modernist conceptions of self and the difficulties they present in the face of postmodern 
sensibilities:  
                                                
14 I leave to others—primarily philosophers and psychologists—the detailing of differences among “self,” 
“identity,” and “subjectivity.” They are complicated.  Even theorists who have built their professional 
lives around the study of identity or the self or subjectivity disagree about distinctions among them.  This 
will be addressed further in the discussion of Erikson later in this chapter.  For our purposes now, though, 
I would like to stipulate that these terms, though not necessarily interchangeable, are closely related. 
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While I teach the importance of considering the sociocultural, socio-
 political and socio-historical influences in shaping human distress, I 
 continue to be surprised how I keep slipping into individualistic, 
 negative and totalizing descriptions to depict students, peers, clients, and 
 others [. . .].  It is a struggle to avoid the embrace of a Eurocentric 
 position and the autonomous voice that stands in stark contrast to the 
 collective voices of communality. (77 – 78) 
Like Yancey, we and our students tend to cling to conceptions of self in opposition to 
the indeterminacy of postmodernism.   
 
Student Subjectivity in First-Year Composition  
 We need to consider how students entering our first-year writing courses are 
challenged by these orientations to thought and self.  Faigley provides us with a means 
by which we can better understand such challenges.  He examines the student 
subjectivities assumed by current practices in composition classes and questions 
whether these are appropriate for students living in a postmodern world.  He points out 
that, though there is much evidence of the effects of postmodern living on students, 
composition instructors continue to privilege a modern subject, one that is whole and 
knowing, one that “possess[es] an identifiable ‘true’ self [which] can be expressed in 
discourse” (122).  In reviewing composition textbooks and practices, he finds that, by 
and large, composition classes are trying to create selves that are “reasonable, 
authoritative, and objective” (162), a self the same as Lanham’s central self, the 
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introspective “knower” described by Ong.  The subject privileged, in fact trained 
toward, in composition classes is the self of modernist print technology, not the self of 
postmodern digital culture. 
 The study of subject creation in composition classes is important because, as 
Faigley points out, our evaluation of student writing is influenced by how we see those 
selves constructed.  That is, a student’s writing is perceived as good only if the self 
portrayed by it conforms to the instructor’s notions of self (23).  It is crucial, then, for us 
to consider new ways to address issues of subjectivity in our writing classes.  I argue 
that working with our students to develop new constructions of ethos might be a way 
into these dilemmas.  If, however, we are to include instruction in ethos as part of a 
writing curriculum, it is crucial for us to consider not only how students’ understanding 
of ethos might be undermined by the creation of fragmented subjectivities in a 
postmodern, digital world, but also how our understanding of ethos has been disciplined 
by the culture we have experienced.  If we understand the complications of teaching 
ethos presented by the subjectivities of the students we teach, we also have to 
understand the selves we expect them to be as they write, the types of ethos available to 
them and to which we will respond when we read their work.  If, for example, we have 
been disciplined by current-traditional notions of the subjectivity of the writer, we must 
interrogate how those notions play out as we work with students developing an 
understanding of ethos and attempting to develop that understanding into discursive 
practice.  This kind of introspection could be an enormous challenge to teachers in 
developing curricula.  Given the possibility that we might succumb to hopelessness and 
 
 67 
helplessness in the face of postmodern conditions, we may fear what we learn about 
ourselves and our world.  It would be easy to respond pessimistically, to perceive the 
gap between our students’ orientation toward the world disciplined by postmodernism 
and digital experience and our own expectations of them in our classrooms, to wallow 
in Baudrillard and give in to the notion that higher education and the students within it 
are only, like everything else in the world, fragments of a deconstructed universe with 
our only option to “play” with them because no pedagogy can address the ills 
Baudrillard ascribes to culture.  Arriving at such a point leaves us with little to do but to 
shut the doors of the academy, an event not likely to happen.  Our project, then, is to 
create curricula in response to who our students are and how the world disciplines them, 
and that means looking at students and their world through a new lens, one that accepts 
and understands the fragmentations and lack of wholeness. 
Faigley points outs that this view of the self as fragmented has proven a 
problematic and a site for resistance to postmodernism in composition pedagogy:  
  Where composition studies has proven least receptive to postmodern 
  theory is in surrendering its belief in the writer as an autonomous self 
  [. . .].  Since the beginning of composition teaching in the late nineteenth 
  century, college writing teachers have been heavily invested in the  
  stability of the self and the attendant beliefs that writing can be a means 
  of self-discovery and intellectual self-realization.  (15) 
And that brings us back to that paradox of belief in modernist notions as we experience  
postmodern life.  If the postmodern self is not unitary or autonomous, relying on 
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locating or portraying a stable ethos to effect persuasion is futile.  The ancients’ concern 
about whether a persuasive ethos resides in the life of the rhetor or in the moment of 
discourse becomes a moot point.  If there is no enduring character of the rhetor, ethos 
can exist only in the moment of discourse.  Buying into this notion, however, seems to 
complicate further.  Teachers may find themselves confronted by an ethical dilemma: 
either teach ethos as ever-changing, always constructed for the moment of discourse (a 
component in the type of rhetoric that Plato railed against) or leave it out of 
composition pedagogy entirely.  Perhaps this choice is the limitation that drives teachers 
and theorists away from the idea of raising the issue of ethos in composition courses.  
How can we justify performing the anti-Platonic when we want our students to operate 
from a base of values with a sense of ethics?  I believe that this is a false dilemma, a 
topic addressed in the next chapter.  The real question is how to theorize ethos within a 
postmodern sensibility, an ethos that grows out of and reflects this world. 
 
Where First-Year College Students Are: Considering Erikson’s Fifth Stage  
 Even if we can come to terms with a new conception of ethos that agrees with 
postmodern views of subjectivity, we must face the challenge of raising issues of self 
and subjectivity with classrooms full of late adolescents.  Before constructing effective 
composition pedagogies, we must know who our students are; we need to understand 
where they are developmentally, and we need to understand the world they experience. 
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To learn more about the psychosocial development of first-year college 
students,15 we can look to Erik Erikson, who was especially interested in the challenges 
of moving from late adolescence into adulthood.16  His studies centered on the 
development of identity.  Based on the understanding that psychological development 
cannot reasonably be considered independent of the society into which a person is born, 
Erikson’s theories underscore the importance of context, the interrelationship between 
individual and community in human identity formation.  Erikson maintains that identity 
develops in eight stages that span the life cycle and is fueled by crises or conflicts which 
cause disequilibrium and result in movement from one stage to the next.  Traditional 
students in their first years of college are typically in the late adolescent, or fifth, stage, 
dealing with crises that contribute to identity formation in their adult stage.  If we accept 
Erikson’s theories, we understand that our students are wrestling with what he calls 
“identity diffusion,” known sometimes as role or identity confusion or identity crisis.   
 The primary task for adolescents and older adolescents in this fifth stage of 
development is to establish an ego identity, and this process is fraught with difficulties.  
Erikson points out “that the adolescent, during the final stage of his identity formation, 
is apt to suffer more deeply than he ever did before (or ever will again) from a diffusion 
                                                
15 Though this discussion focuses on late adolescent/early adult students, these do not comprise our total 
student body.  Demographics fluctuate, especially with national and international economic changes, so 
there are times when our population of nontraditional (typically adults returning to college) is higher than 
others.  Still, the majority of most first-year students in the United States is of traditional age, seventeen 
to nineteen years old. 
16 Despite the period of time which has elapsed since the 1950 publication of Erikson’s initial work, 
Childhood and Society, his theories of psychosocial development are still highly regarded and are often 
used as the foundation for further research and speculation on identity development.  More recent 
scholars such as James Marcia have built their work around Erikson’s, further elaborating on his initial 
theories.  Others have found fault with Erikson’s sex differences, especially his treatment of women’s 





of roles [. . .]” (“Problem” 117).  This is a time of experimentation for the late 
adolescent, a time when the issue of self-image acquires greater importance.  Key to 
understanding who our students are in Erikson’s schema is his contention that “[a] state 
of acute identity diffusion usually becomes manifest at a time when the young 
individual finds himself exposed to a combination of experiences which demand his 
simultaneous commitment to physical intimacy (not by any means always overtly 
sexual), to decisive occupational choice, to energetic competition, and to psychosocial 
self-definition” (“Problem” 123).  Could any situation be more rife with these variables 
than first-year college students’ lives?  Most of them live in a new type of intimacy, 
with strangers who now share their most personal spaces; they are driven—by parents if 
not by their choices of majors—to make decisions about “what they’re going to be” 
after college; they find themselves competing academically, socially, and physically in 
new and strange situations; and, for many students, they are struggling to define 
themselves as apart from their families of origin and even their geographic locations.   
 The picture Erikson paints of the students most likely to be in our composition 
classes should give us pause as we consider the enterprise of having them think about 
their subjectivities, about who they are or who they seem to be to their prospective 
audiences.  There are psychological dangers here, to be sure, but that is not what 
concerns me most.  Those dangers exist whether we raise them in our classes or not.   
Erikson discusses at length the “symptoms” of adolescence, pointing out that “in spite 
of the similarity of adolescent ‘symptoms’ and episodes to neurotic and psychotic 
symptoms and episodes, adolescence is not an affliction but a normative crisis, i.e., a 
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normal phase of increased conflict characterized by a seeming fluctuation in ego 
strength, and yet also by a high growth potential” (“Problem” 116).  If we raise 
questions about the appearance and reality of who they are as rhetors, our job is 
complicated by the difficulties our students are experiencing.  We most certainly do not 
want to increase this painful time for them—and I am not minimizing the ethical 
dimensions of this—but my concern in this specific context is the pedagogical 
possibility of addressing the concept of ethos with people in the midst of identity 
diffusion, in the process of wrestling with who they are and who they will be. 
 Erikson contends that adolescents often experience the same types of conflicts 
they did in childhood but now in different ways.  For example, despite the fact that they 
may have already learned to trust themselves and others, they are now confronted with 
seemingly larger issues of trust and faith: in what can they believe and in what ways can 
they become trustworthy (Identity 128-129)?  Compounding the intensity of the crisis of 
identity for adolescents is the enlarged society in which they must operate.  At early 
stages of their development, their societies were their families, later their schools; now 
they are learning who they are within a larger world. 
Identity, according to Erikson, can be a problematic term.  It is, he says, an 
individual’s connection to his or her community, both family and society, as well as 
something “in the individual’s core,” and it can be understood, he goes on to say, within 
several contexts: “at one time, then, it will appear to refer to a conscious sense of 
individual identity; at another to an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal 
character; at a third, as a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis, and finally, as a 
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maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group’s ideals and identity” (“Problem” 102).   
Erikson acknowledges not only the slipperiness of the term “identity” but also 
implicates himself in his slippery use of it, asserting that “I have tried out the term 
identity almost deliberately—I like to think—in many different connotations [. . .].  And 
on more than one occasion the word slipped in more like a habit that seems to make 
things appear familiar than as a clarification” (Identity 208).  Whether the term has 
consistent meaning in discourse or not, we can understand it to approximate, at least 
generally, how people see themselves. Erikson’s own unstable use of the term should 
hearten those of us who find its multiple meanings frustrating and should not prevent us 
from proceeding in the effort to understand our students’ developmental stages. 
 
Our Students in the World of Digital Communications 
 Clearly, managing psychosocial growth through identity diffusion with its 
attendant conflicts and crises is difficult, even in a world where communities are 
homogenous and where beliefs and values are agreed upon, but complicating the 
process today are the realities of the twenty-first century and its pluralisms, the paradox 
of fundamentalism and nationalism in the face of fragmentation, the barrage of images 
that seem more real than experience itself.  These conditions most definitely present 
challenges to those of us who teach composition and rhetoric, especially if we are 
considering the inclusion of ethos in our pedagogies.  
One condition of the contemporary world, the prevalence of digital 
communications technologies, allows, indeed encourages, students to enact 
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postmodernism in their daily lives and affects how they think as well as who they are.  
Anyone paying the least attention knows that digital technology thrives and that today’s 
college students are not only accustomed to but habituated by computers, iPods, and 
mobile telephones.  Parents and teachers born before 1970 are often confounded by the 
constant links younger people have to their social networks.  Aside from such anecdotal 
reports, there are data supporting the prevalent use of digital communications by 
students.  John H. Pryor, Sylvia Hurtado, Jessica Sharkness, and William S. Korn 
reported that 86.3% of fall 2007 freshmen surveyed through the Cooperative 
Institutional Research Program (CIRP) said they go to social networking sites 
(Facebook and MySpace) every week, and nearly one-fifth of them said they spend six 
or more hours on the sites per week (3).  Likewise, the American Association of 
Colleges & Universities (AAC&U), referencing a survey detailed in The State of Our 
Nation’s Youth: 2008-2009, reports that the use of the internet for social networking 
sites takes up an average of over six hours a week for the students surveyed (AAC&U).  
An older study, conducted in 2002 by Harris Interactive and 360 Youth, found that 
eighty-eight percent of college students owned a computer, using it to communicate 
socially (42%) and to check email at least once a day (72%).  The study further found 
that sixty-seven percent of college students owned cell phones and thirty-six percent 
used their mobile devices to access the Internet (Greenspan 1)—and this was before the 
ever-present iPhone appeared on the scene.  It is certainly reasonable to conclude that 
those figures would be considerably higher today. 
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The point is this: our students are communicating frequently using these 
technologies.  They are, for many students, their primary method of maintaining contact 
with other people, and this type and frequency of communication has an effect on how 
students think and write.  Not only can being “plugged in” affect their sense of what 
goes on in the world; it also influences how they use language.  Consider how students 
today use computers: in addition to the word processing we teachers require of them, 
they spend hours online, blogging, checking on and communicating with their Facebook 
or MySpace “friends,” emailing, sending and receiving instant messages, participating 
in chat rooms, surfing the net, and playing games.  Consider also the characteristics of 
many acts of electronic communication.  Discourse—especially in instant messages, 
text messages, and chat rooms or other networked environments—is characterized by 
brevity, informality, hastiness—in short, by its fragmentary nature.  Topics change 
rapidly, with responses to old topics appearing several screens later.  Scrolling through 
the record of a chat room text reads at times like absurd conversation, with no one 
obviously responding to anyone else but everyone making a “contribution.”  
Communicating within such environments works best for people who require little 
continuity, who have no qualms about jumping into a conversation in the middle and 
with little knowledge, people who are comfortable with fragmentary discourse rather 
than expecting the sense of wholeness we expect in most printed communication.  
These are dominant ways in which our students communicate regularly and 
comfortably; the speed and brevity of such transmissions are enactments of the 
postmodern and reinforce fragmentation. 
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Even when our students conduct research, they are typically working in online 
environments, usually where hypertext dominates.  Whether or not they are frequent 
users of text messaging or social networks, students’ thinking can be influenced by the 
workings of hypertext.  It, too, reinforces random, fragmented thinking.  Characterized 
by its lack of linearity, its lack of sequence and predictability, hypertext opposes a sense 
of wholeness. With a printed text, we can see its boundaries—its beginning and its end; 
in hypertext, though we may be able to discern a starting point, we negotiate our own 
ending by opening link after link until we reach some point at which we simply draw 
our reading to a close.  Jay David Bolter points out that “in any true hypertext the 
ending must remain tentative.  An electronic text never needs to end” (87). 
 Bolter also raises the issue of heterogeneity of digital texts, asserting that “[a]n 
electronic book is a structure that reaches out to other structures, not only 
metaphorically, as does a printed book, but operationally” (87).  As we work through 
hypertext presentations, we find links that are visual—images and videos rather than 
words.  Such links become part of the “whole” electronic text, but it is a very different 
kind of wholeness than we find in print.  It is true that print texts include photographs 
and drawings; in hypertext, though, the visual links are weightier than are illustrations 
in printed texts.  They carry the same emphasis, the same weight, as every other link, 
leaving the reader with the perception that visuals are just as important as the verbal.  
This creates a different orientation, a different experience to text than does print: we 
expect words to be of primary importance in print and regard illustrations as just that, 
illustrations, secondary to the words in the text.  In hypertext, though, images share 
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primary importance with words on our monitor, and the experience of homogeneity in 
reading print texts becomes disrupted by the heterogeneity of hypertext—all further 
enactment of the postmodern that can have an effect on thinking and writing. 
 One of the more striking differences between printed text and hypertext is that, 
while we expect printed texts to be logical in their organization and development, 
hypertext is associative rather than logical and cumulative rather than selective in its 
development.  John M. Slatin writes that “the hyperdocument ‘grows’ by process of 
accretion, whereas the conventional document tends to have been winnowed out of a 
larger mass of material [. . .].  [Hypertext is] a collection of possible documents any one 
of which may be actualized by readers pursuing or creating links between elements of 
the system” (876).  Thus, readers of hypertext expect a collection of links arranged by 
associations the writer makes that readers can manipulate by following their own 
associations.  Readers can, in effect, create their own texts from the variables presented 
by the writer. 
 Frequent readers of electronic communications—hypertext, instant messages, 
discourse in chat rooms—adapt to a lack of logical sequencing, to the randomness of 
the volatile medium.  Such communication is characterized by fragmentation rather than 
wholeness, so students accustomed to working in this milieu develop habits of thinking, 
especially the thinking that accompanies writing, antithetical to wholeness.  And this 
manner of thinking affects subjective structures.  Marshall McLuhan, Walter Ong, and 
Richard Lanham have all considered how communication technologies affect the self.  
McLuhan and Ong look primarily at how the move from orality to literacy affects 
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people, how experiencing the printed word creates differences in people than when their 
communications are oral.  Though this move from orality to literacy is not our concern 
at the moment, it does enlighten and can contribute to our understanding of how various 
technologies have different effects on people’s ways of thinking, even being. 
 In Gutenberg Galaxy, McLuhan points out that oral cultures are social cultures; 
they are tribal, “community [in] non-personal collectivity” (121).  Such tribalism 
changes, however, when communication technology changes.  According to McLuhan, 
reading print isolates people, creating greater individualism than they have in oral 
culture.  Even religion, he points out, is more individual in a literate society; after print, 
the focus moves from an “objective to a subjective piety” (139).  People interacting 
with printed scripture experience the words and ideas more personally than they might 
when participating orally in a communal ritual. 
 McLuhan goes on to make the paradoxical claim that print creates both greater 
individualism and greater nationalism.  Characterized by homogeneity, specialization, 
and interdependence, print allows many people to read exactly the same words—they 
may encounter them alone, but they join with others and know they join with them 
because of the repeatability of the text.  Reading printed language is, for McLuhan, “the 
uniform processing of minds” (209).  Not only does print with its possibilities for 
homogenization create a greater wholeness within individuals; it also creates a greater 
wholeness within societies.  One culture in particular that grows more uniform is the 
culture of education.  The textbook, from the time of Ramus on, was used as a means to 
homogenize students, to present them with the “tangible, repeatable, visible proof” 
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(McLuhan 184) that literate cultures seek (and believe is possible).  To imply there is a 
proof is to imply there is a truth, and truths come to us whole.  To work with printed 
texts is to work with and be accustomed to wholeness. 
 Walter Ong, in Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, casts 
clarifying light on the effects of print on individual psyches.  He explicates the 
relationship between human  beings and language use, providing a list of the 
“psychodynamics of orality.”  He shows how thinking in an oral culture is related 
directly to communication rather than isolated in its significance to the mind of the 
reader.  Reading is an internal process that may have little to do with communication.  
Like McLuhan, Ong sees interaction with printed text as reflective and, thus, a force in 
creating a sense of isolation in literate people.  Printed writing is self-contained rather 
than obviously contextual as oral communication is.  Ong says, “Print encourages a 
sense of closure, a sense that what is found in a text has been finalized, has reached a 
state of completion” (132).  Books are read in silence and in private, they can be 
duplicated many times over, and they appear unchangeable.  Interaction with printed 
texts masquerades as interaction directly with the mind of the writer, but a writer who 
cannot be challenged.  Ong points out that even “after absolutely total and devastating 
refutation, [the text] says exactly the same thing as before” (79) and takes on the 
appearance of irrefutable truth.  So we see books as closed, unchangeable, and 
authoritative, as representations of wholeness and truth. 
 In examining Gutenberg Galaxy and Orality and Literacy, we find that both 
McLuhan and Ong do concern themselves with the effects of print technology on the 
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self.  The move toward introspection that print engenders is recognized by both.  
McLuhan makes much of the fact that print brings with it a narrowing in point of view.  
Until print technology is established, point of view is hardly an issue—oral 
communications are adapted to the situation and can be an amalgam of many points of 
view—but with print, a private point of view, a private stance, is not only possible but 
probable.  The fragmentation of point of view in orality becomes the wholeness in 
literacy when print technology becomes dominant. 
 Ong also addresses the development of introspection as a result of print 
technology: 
  By separating the knower from the known [. . .] , writing makes possible 
  increasingly articulate introspectivity, opining the psyche as never before 
  not only to the external objective world quite distinct from itself but also 
  the interior self against whom the objective world is set.  Writing makes 
  possible the great introspective religious traditions such as Buddhism, 
  Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. (105) 
To consider an introspective subject with a private point of view is to consider a subject 
characterized by wholeness, a self that understands itself as separate and unified. 
 We can, perhaps, better understand the definition of self in relation to 
communication technology by considering the social self of oral culture in opposition to 
the central self of print culture.  According to Ong, oral cultures are made up of people 
“more communal and externalized and less introspective than those common among 
literates” (69).  Such a communal, externalized being could represent for us the social 
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self Richard Lanham refers to in The Electronic Word, “the actor’s self, performative, 
social rather than central, [. . .] a self good at reading the social surface and providing 
what was decorous for that time and place” as opposed to his central self, “meaning 
really us” (144).  These oral people, these social selves, operate within their societies, 
understanding themselves and functioning as themselves in the context of their 
environment to a degree not possible after the dominance of literacy.  Ong tells us that 
“[i]n primary oral cultures, even business is not business: it is fundamentally rhetoric  
[. . .] , a series of verbal (and somatic) maneuvers, a polite duel, a contest of wits, and 
operation in oral agonistic” (68).  The words of people in oral culture are situational, 
embedded in their lively context, not context free and rendered permanent by print.  In a 
private, introspective reading of a printed text, however, the existential situation of the 
reader reduces the “duel,” the “contest,” to a quiet struggle between the reader, a 
distinct entity, a whole self, and the text with its idea shining through the “crystal 
goblet” of print (Lanham 74).  The central self, then, functioning as a separate, whole 
self, is representative of print culture, characterized by its insistence on a fixed truth that 
exists regardless of context, written about in texts trusted to be authoritative, 
unchangeable, and finalized. 
 As people become less tribal, they see themselves differently; as they develop 
their individuality, they have a different conception of self than when they saw 
themselves as part of a collective.  And this change in self is not minor: it effects the 
changes to culture brought by communication technology.  Interestingly, though 
McLuhan, Ong, and Lanham write about broad changes in culture, their ideas are based 
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on the primary assumption that communication technology affects the actual 
functioning of the individual and in the ways the self perceives itself in relation to 
society.  Neither Ong nor McLuhan speaks directly to the issues raised by our students’ 
lives in a postmodern, digital world; the value of their work to this study is in their 
demonstrating the change in thought and self as a result of the changes in 
communication technology.   Both make the case for the influence of technologies on 
people’s consciousness. 
McLuhan recognized more than forty  years ago that the electronic age would 
change sense dominance again, that “our electric technology has consequences for our 
most ordinary perceptions and habits of action which are quickly recreating in us the 
mental processes of the most primitive men” (30).  He warns that electronic technology 
will decrease specialization and move us back into a more tribal societal structure, this 
time in his “global village.”  Ong proposes that we are moving into a secondary orality, 
one similar to primary orality in its sense of community and its emphasis on interaction 
with context, but different from primary orality because of its self-consciousness: we 
are aware of where we have been—inside ourselves, with our central selves—and now 
we can be conscious of both the central and the social self.  Although Ong 
conceptualized secondary orality before the advent of digital communications, this 
theory, though responding to truly oral media such as radio and television, does help us 
to understand the change in consciousness elicited by digital communications.  Indeed, 
in a 1996 interview in Composition FORUM with Michael Klein and Frederic Gale, 
Ong says that, though he first used the term “secondary orality” in explaining the effects 
 
 82 
of radio and television, he now includes “electronic verbalization[s] which are not really 
oral at all” because “computerized communication can thus suggest the immediate 
experience of direct sound [. . .].  Here textualized verbal exchange registers 
psychologically as having the temporal immediacy of oral exchange” (qtd. in Notes 
from the Walter Ong Collection).  Ong posits that secondary orality combines 
characteristics of literacy and orality: secondary orality, based in text—in fact, requiring 
writing—along with newer technologies, causes consciousness to transform into one 
akin to the consciousness of orality, creating a greater emphasis on community, 
participation and aggregate knowledge rather than individuality and “owned” 
knowledge, characteristics of literate consciousness. 
  
The Challenge 
 Including ethos in rhetorical instruction, then, requires that we take up several 
significant challenges, the largest of which is probably determining how to manage 
postmodern views of identity and subjectivity with students who will likely resist 
learning that they are not autonomous, unitary, stable subjects at a time when they are 
already struggling with identity diffusion.  By examining alternate and varying 
subjectivities, though, we can help students understand the subject positions they 
occupy and how those subjectivities are created.  Students can remain fragmented 
selves who think in fragmented ways, who understand ethos in ways far different from 
those laid out by the ancients, but looking seriously at subject positions could increase 
self-consciousness, making students more aware of who they are as well as who they 
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appear to be.  Rather than remaining simply subject to the fragmentation of postmodern 
culture and digital life, they could, perhaps, negotiate selves rhetorically through 
understanding the role and construction of ethos in their discourses.  Set with this task, 
then, the next step is to theorize ethos for the twenty-first century: how can we reconcile 
the concept of ethos with the situation we are in—a heterogeneous student body of 
students struggling to create their adult identities, a lack of stable definition of the Good 
and the True, the effects of postmodern, digital life on our views of self, and the ethical 
dilemma of creating appearances for persuasive purposes?  In the next chapter, I 
propose a theory of ethos, take up the challenges to teaching ethos, and provide a 
















Chapter 3:  Locating Ethos in the Borderlands 
 
Unlike the ethos conceptualized by ancient rhetorics, contemporary 
constructions of ethos cannot presume a stable self or a stable location. Instead, any new 
conception of ethos must take fluidity of self and location into account. Because of 
postmodern sensibilities, as well as contemporary discursive practices, a new 
conception of ethos must include multiple contexts, multiple sites for ethos 
performance, and multiple ways of being in those locations.  For the following reasons, 
I find theories of the borderlands useful in thinking about a contemporary ethos: 
1. we all negotiate multiple borders in our daily lives,  
2. though borders and boundaries can be fixed, many are malleable/unstable and 
can be penetrated, 
3. effective cross-border communication requires an ethos constructed with an 
awareness of difference in culture, in values, in language, and in subjectivity. 
Though border studies and border theories initially grew out of physical, 
geographical locations, we can consider the border a trope representing an appropriate 
site for conceptualizing a new ethos because of the ever-present margins in our world—
margins between men and women, among ethnic and racial groups, between poverty 
and wealth, between political groups. Gloria Anzaldua speaks to the multiplicity of 
borders when she opens Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza: 
  The actual physical borderland that I’m dealing with in this book is the 
  Texas-U. S. Southwest/Mexican border.  The psychological borderlands, 
  the sexual borderlands and the spiritual borderlands are not particular to 
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  the Southwest.  In fact, the Borderlands are physically present wherever 
  two or more cultures edge each other, where people of different races 
  occupy the same territory, where under, lower, middle and upper classes 
  touch, where the space between two individuals shrinks with intimacy  
[. . .]. (Pref.) 
The emphasis here is upon the collision of differences. In the binary thinking that has 
long characterized Western sensibilities, difference (e.g., race, gender, sexual 
orientation, class) often results in divisive critique that values One over the Other.   The 
result is the creation of a hierarchy of acceptability: to put it simply, the One is “good,” 
the Other “bad;” the One is “right,” the Other “wrong.”   The conflicts that occur in 
borderlands rise out of a rich mix of difference and power, and the kind of binary 
thinking that divides the One from the Other and assigns specific hierarchical valences 
to them also tempts us to see the use of power in an overly simplistic way.  If we look at 
power as Michel Foucault does, however, we will have a better comprehension of how 
it works in border conflicts.  Foucault’s insights about power are especially useful in 
understanding how people negotiate borders because he dismantles widely-held 
conceptions of who has power and how they use it.  In The History of Sexuality: An 
Introduction, Foucault begins his explanation of power by specifying what it is not: 
  By power, I do not mean “Power” as a group of institutions and  
  mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state.  
  By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in  
  contrast to violence, has the form of the rule.  Finally, I do not have in 
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  mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, 
  a system whose effects, through successive derivations, 
  pervade the entire social body. (92) 
Instead of conceptualizing power as something held only by large institutions or 
government, Foucault argues that power is ever present, that everyone has it.  The 
simplistic view of power in borderlands is that the dominant culture or race or religion 
always holds all the power and that oppression, domination, and subjugation define that 
power.  Though oppression, domination, and subjugation may be a result of multiple 
power relationships, they are not the only manifestations of power.  Foucault 
particularizes, locating the development of power from the “grass roots,” specifying that 
“[p]ower comes from below” (Foucault, History 94), that it functions in individual 
relationships—in families and workplaces and schools—which  
are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the 
social body as a whole.  These then form a general line of force that 
traverses the local oppositions and links them together; to be sure, they 
also bring about redistributions, realignments, homogenizations, serial 
arrangements, and convergences of the force relations.  Major 
dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these 
confrontations. (Foucault, History 94)   
An example of this process as it has been enacted in a borderland is the subordination of 
American Indians in the United States.  Using the model of Foucault’s theory of power, 
we understand that no one sent the explorers and colonizers to this land to exert power 
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over the Indians.  There was no systematic plan that led to the hegemony of Whites.  
Instead, it began with individual desires and purposes, with men who came to claim 
land and the strategies they used to gain it.  Their individual acts of power over the 
natives grew by accretion, connecting to others’ acts of power until their dominance 
was an entire system of thoughts, behaviors, and language.  The long quotation which 
follows from The History of Sexuality outlines Foucault’s conception of such a process: 
  [T]here is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and  
  objectives.  But this does not mean that it results from the choice or 
  decision of an individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that 
  presides over its rationality; neither the caste which governs, nor the 
  groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most 
  important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that 
  functions in a society (and makes it function); the rationality of power is 
  characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level 
  where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, 
  becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one 
  another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, 
  end by forming comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the 
  aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have 
  invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an 
  implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken  
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  strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose “inventors” or 
  decisionmakers are often without hypocrisy. (95) 
I appropriate none of this to minimize the atrocities performed by Whites as they 
exerted power over Indians, nor to lessen the significance of the hegemony that grew 
out of the individual acts. Understanding power in Foucault’s terms helps us to locate 
its beginning squarely in individual human desires and actions that occur in specific 
contexts.  The local nature of power’s inception is especially important to understanding 
the consciousness that develops on borders.  The manner in which power is used in 
individual contacts between people on both sides of the border, either metaphorical or 
geophysical, sets the stage for larger systems, which can become reified. 
Resistance to power grows in much the same way.  Foucault contends that 
resistance always exists alongside power, that there is no power relationship without 
both. He claims that resistance takes multiple shapes; some are “possible, necessary, 
improbable; others [. . .] are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or 
violent; still others [. . .] are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial [. . .]” (96).  
Likewise, resistance occurs at a multiplicity of sites and is enacted by both individuals 
and groups.  Sometimes multiple resistances accrue, adding up to revolution, but more 
often, Foucault says,  
one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing 
cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting  
regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up 
and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their 
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bodies and minds.  Just as the network of power relations ends by 
forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, 
without being  exactly localized in them, so too the swarm of points of 
resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities.  And it is 
doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that 
makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the 
state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships. (96) 
Especially in this final parallel, Foucault helps us to understand power and resistance as 
human activities that depend upon connections, upon human relationships and their 
resulting actions.  This is an important point in conceptualizing/imagining the border.  It 
prevents us from looking at power as static or stable and wielded from on high.  And it 
grants a hopeful view in considering a border ethos.  Considering power as ever present 
in all people strengthens the idea that ethos matters; constructing an appropriate ethos 
for persuasive purposes can have results.  
 This discussion of Foucault’s notions of power has taken us into abstractions 
which need to be grounded.  Grand-scale borders (such as borders between countries) 
and uses of power (such as those employed on the part of nations) are important, to be 
sure, but so too are the borders and uses of power people experience in their daily lives.  
While it is common to think of the “marginalized” as large groups of people who have 
been subordinated and discriminated against because of race, sex, or religion, for 
example, we must also consider the smaller, quotidian marginalizations everyone 
experiences.  Students may develop a greater understanding of marginalization in 
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considering exclusions they have witnessed or experienced in their schools, exclusions 
and categorizations typically predicated on stereotypes and false binaries but real in 
student experience.  Anyone who has been in high school in the United States or who 
has observed popular culture through television and in movies is familiar with the 
presumed characteristics that can lead to exclusion, oppression, domination, even 
subjugation of groups of people considered geeks or the “in group” or athletes or 
intellectuals.  Such categorization extends into college and the professions, leading to 
ridicule and a type of caste-making of people based on their interests and areas of 
excellence: we have all heard jokes about lawyers and teachers. This is not to say that 
slights, especially fairly innocuous jokes that people experience from time to time are as 
important as those that have broader social codification and more serious ramifications.  
Examining these smaller-scale marginalizations is simply a starting point for 
understanding the experience of dwelling on a border.   
 Borders are the results of power activities; they have been drawn to isolate 
people into distinct groups, to isolate them rather than to grant them access to some 
place that is valued.  But, though some borders seem impenetrable, most are not.  
Before we can conceptualize a border ethos, we must first recognize that margins and 
borders are negotiable boundaries rather than impenetrable lines of division.  The image 
of a penetrable border has its basis in geopolitical fact: people who live on the physical 
border between Mexico and the United States move back and forth through the 
boundary regularly: they speak both Spanish and English and learn to negotiate cultural 
difference.  If we imagine rhetors as border dwellers, we can begin to understand ethos 
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in a way which answers the concerns of the postmodern self participating in multiple 
discourses. 
 Before discussing more specifically how border ethos can be incorporated into 
composition pedagogy, it is important to consider how such a pedagogical move fits 
into composition course objectives.  Clearly, there is no single purpose for composition 
as an elective or required course in higher education.  Still, I would like to stipulate that 
the following are some significant goals for composition courses and programs: 
students will develop rhetorical understanding, begin to claim their own discursive 
space through thoughtful practice, and think critically about discursive contexts.   
Though stated in contemporary terms, these goals approximate the goals the ancients 
had for rhetorical education—to prepare citizens, to help students learn to think 
critically so they can participate thoughtfully in civic discourse, to help them move 
toward wisdom and, yes, even good character.17  We want our students to do what 
Isocrates asked his audience to do as he delivered his Antidosis: to understand the 
demands of different types of discourse, to pay close attention to what is being said, to 
take the time to think things through, and to delay judgment until after thoughtful 
consideration and with good will (12 – 28).   
 Debates about the purpose of composition as a course of study—whether the 
value of composition is pragmatism or critical consciousness or effective citizenship—
have led some teachers down blind paths.  Theorizing, studying, and teaching ethos, 
however, can redirect the efforts of composition professionals and, perhaps, allow the 
                                                
17 Inserting this reference to good character is not intended as a negation of the problems raised earlier 
regarding classical notions of ethos.  It is, instead, a bridge to later discussion about what might constitute 
good character in a new conception of ethos. 
 
 92 
debates to reach a draw.  Creation of ethos as a subject and a practice both complicates 
and makes accessible some of the issues important to rhetors today, and reconceiving of 
ethos as located in borderlands opens up possibilities for refocusing and reinvigorating 
rhetorical instruction in several ways: constructions of ethos are related to constructions 
of self, and both are relevant to students' lives in general but also in their roles as 
rhetors; instruction in ethos can introduce both classical and contemporary rhetorical 
concepts useful to writers today; focus on ethos emphasizes the social function and the 
performativity of rhetoric; and a course centered on ethos allows investigations of 
power relations, both in the classroom and in the world at large.  These possibilities 
work together to support the goals of composition courses and programs, providing 
students with rhetorical understanding, giving them processes and concepts for thinking 
critically about discursive contexts, and ultimately giving them the opportunity to claim 
their own discursive space, performing as mindful rhetors.  The following section 
begins to chart more specifically the pedagogical value of an undergraduate 
composition program founded upon ethos studies. 
First, composition pedagogy which includes instruction in border ethos would 
enable work with conceptions of self.  Students should be given the opportunity to 
interrogate the fictive but disciplining unitary, stable self that continues to reside in our 
culture's imagination, and they should be able to explore alternatives.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, this is generally delicate work; first-year students may resist any 
challenges to their individuality and uniqueness.  They are, after all, older adolescents 
who are just beginning to see themselves as separate, autonomous individuals.  
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However, providing them with the concept of a borderlands ethos and helping them 
imagine and practice ethos creation for multiple rhetorical moments can perhaps 
alleviate some of the distress of indeterminacy.  They can learn to take an active part in 
analyzing their worlds and their places in them, considering the roles of others in 
constructions of self from situation to situation, moment to moment, culture to culture, 
and to respond kairotically and ethically as informed rhetors.   
Understanding the exigencies of discourse situations and how ethos functions 
within them deepens rhetorical understanding and helps students lay claim to their own 
discursive space.  Responsible instruction in ethos, like responsible instruction in 
rhetoric in general, demands attention to subjectivities, audiences, purposes, social 
constructions of language and selves, and a persistent interrogation of hierarchies, 
"common sense," and "neutral language."  A problem with traditional, uninterrogated 
instruction in ethos, approached simply as one of many terms or concepts a student of 
rhetoric "should know," left unexamined and unsupported by rhetorical theory, becomes 
yet another "device," just one more element in a formula for producing text.  A course 
centered on ethos, however, gets at the heart of rhetoric.  Real attention to conceptions 
of ethos and the theories that support and challenge it, added to conscious practice in 
enacting it, allows students to learn actively and self-consciously the function of 
rhetoric in their complicated lives as rhetors.  Reading and talking about how 
subjectivities are formed may be interesting to both teachers and students, but 
constructing an ethos contextualized for a specific rhetorical act from a considered 
subject position is rhetoric.    
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Second, instruction in ethos serves as entrée into instruction in both classical and 
contemporary rhetorical concepts, allowing, for example, introductions to concepts with 
immediate usefulness such as rhetor-audience relationships; the relationship among 
ethos, pathos, and logos; the function and constitution of enthymeme; and the canons of 
rhetoric.  All of these can promote deeper understanding of rhetoric in general and in 
the students’ own discourses.  In addition, introducing concepts key to rhetorical theory 
in first-year composition/rhetoric classes guides students to begin theorizing for 
themselves, an important move for their developing consciousness of discourse.  
Finally, to think critically about discursive contexts, students should learn 
something about dynamic power relations and authority.  Instruction in ethos, especially 
viewed as a borderland construction, promotes such learning.  The teacher in an ethos-
centered classroom could guide students to raise and answer important questions: Who 
gets to speak and when?  What constitutes an authoritative ethos? Does authority derive 
from personality, location, expertise, discourse, or something else entirely? What is the 
ethos of the classroom, how is it constructed, and how does it evolve over time?  What 
ideologies drive the power relations in this class culture and in other social situations?  
Such questions could lead students to think not only about ethos as it is constructed in 
the context of classroom culture but also about influences on the development of their 
characters in their daily lives.  Such questioning could benefit students in what Kay 
Halasek, evoking Bakhtin, refers to as "ideological becoming."  This is, I contend, an 
important goal of higher education in general as well as an ideal of rhetorical 
instruction.  Because of the deep, generative effects of discourse on becoming, bringing 
 
 95 
such conceptions into the students' consciousness is crucial.  As Halasek points out, 
"[C]ompositionists are in a unique position within the academy to provide students the 
tools and strategies from which to pursue their own ideological becoming and work 
against the preformulations of their experiences" (110).  Working with ethos, especially 
from a border-dweller's point of view, is such a tool. 
Even if we agree that including ethos instruction supports our instructional 
objectives in composition classes, we must deal with the challenges to teaching ethos 
raised in chapter 2:  
• postmodern sensibilities and the absence of universal and stable values;  
• the world we live in, characterized by fragmentation, a surplus of images, and 
hyperreality;  
• the possibilities presented by technology for assembling information and 
creating new selves;  
• the developmental stage of our students and the crises of identity formation;  
• resistance to postmodern constructions of subjectivity on the part of both writing 
instructors and students.   
Careful theorizing of borderlands ethos, however, followed by a pedagogy responsive to 
the theory can, I believe, ease the difficulties. 
 
Ethos of the Borderlands and the Absence of Universal Values 
 In answer to the first challenge to teaching ethos—the absence of universal and 
eternal values—I argue that the conception of ethos on borderlands precludes a stable, 
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universal set of values.  Border dwellers know that values do not hold from one culture, 
or even one group within a culture, to another.  People who negotiate the boundaries 
between their own and another culture understand that their values are not universally 
held.  Typically, border studies have investigated the intersection of a non-dominant 
culture with a non-dominant one, usually to point out the tyrannies of the dominant 
culture and its values and to resist them.  Often these intersections have been 
characterized as violent, either psychologically or physically, resulting in colonization 
or massacre.  Anzaldua refers to the border between the United States and Mexico as  
una herida abierta where the Third World grates against the first and 
 bleeds [. . .].  Gringos in the U. S. Southwest consider the inhabitants of 
 the borderlands transgressors, aliens—whether they possess documents 
 or not, whether they’re Chicanos, Indians or Blacks.  Do not enter, 
 trespassers will be raped, maimed, strangled, gassed, shot.  The only 
 ‘legitimate’ inhabitants are those in power, the whites and those who 
 align themselves with whites.  Tension grips the inhabitants of the 
 borderlands like a virus.  Ambivalence and unrest reside there and death 
 is no stranger. (3 - 4)   
Too often borders are sites of violence.  Whether the violence continues to be overt or 
not, though, the memory of it has a disciplining effect on all parties—those who 
inflicted harm and those harmed by it.  The tension about which Anzaldua writes is a 
remnant of the violence leveled against the Mexicans and tejanos (Texans of Mexican 
descent) during the creation of what is now the border between Mexico and Texas.  
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Anglos migrated into the area and drove the natives from their land.  The resulting war, 
culminating in the Battle of the Alamo and the subsequent capture of Santa Anna, gave 
the United States the area we now call the Southwest—Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, 
Colorado, and California, all formerly part of Mexico.  The violence of these events set 
the terms for continuing border conflict.  Anzaldua asserts that the Battle of the Alamo 
“became, for the whites, the symbol for the cowardly and villainous character of the 
Mexicans.  It became (and still is) a symbol that legitimized the white imperialist 
takeover” (6).  These clashes rose out of differences in desires and values: invading 
Anglos wanted land and believed they should have it; Mexicans and tejanos considered 
the area their home and resisted giving it up.  The divisions that resulted in a new shape 
for Mexico and the United States, however, were not based strictly on race or ethnic 
difference but on economics as well.  Wealthy Mexicans were complicit in the U. S. 
takeover of Mexican land, working with Anglos to claim Mexican and Indian land for 
production.  Values, in this case, the actual value of land as well as the 
psychological/sociological/moral value place on ownership of the land, were at the heart 
of the conflict, and these values were definitely not universally held.  The values of 
Manifest Destiny collided with the values of natives who lived on and worked the land, 
and these values fueled the initial acts of power and the resistance and set the stage for 
subsequent border clashes.    
Such dramatic intersections of values are obvious, but not all border conflicts 
derive from overt, concrete displays of value difference.  The borders our students 
might find most relevant to their lives are social borders, boundaries established by 
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differences in the ways people value things such as sexual orientation or age or 
education.  Renato Rosaldo, in Culture and Truth, a foundational text for border studies, 
emphasizes that “[m]ore often than we usually care to think, our everyday lives are 
crisscrossed by border zones, pockets and eruptions of all kinds. Social borders 
frequently become salient around such lines as sexual orientation, gender, class, race, 
ethnicity, nationality, age, politics, dress, food, or taste” (207-208).  By investigating 
the disciplining values in specific borderlands, we and our students can arrive at a 
greater understanding of how the borders are established, how values conflict.  
Examining these value differences can result in important opportunities in composition 
classrooms: it can provide a way to consider ethos, particularly how values shape the 
way rhetors present themselves in performing rhetoric, and it can provide a deeper 
awareness of the absence of universal and eternal values.   
Focusing on borderland ethos and how it is constructed by values and through 
conflicts with other values underscores postmodern sensibilities and reduces or 
eliminates the emphasis on universal and stable values.  It allows students to see that 
culture itself is not a monolith and that there are not only differences but reasons for 
differences among people, thus eliminating the concern that determining ethos must rely 
on only one conception of what is Good and True.   
Henry Giroux’s reading of postmodernism suggests that, rather than posing 
problems for a composition pedagogy that includes border ethos, it provides a rich 
environment for just such instruction.  Because of its dismantling of modernist claims to 
universal values, postmodernism has given us a changed view of knowledge and 
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knowledge production, it has questioned the cultural hierarchies and histories 
instantiated by modernism, “offer[ing] a powerful challenge to the hegemonic notion 
that Eurocentric culture is superior to other cultures and traditions by virtue of its 
canonical status as a universal measure of Western civilization” (55 - 56).  Indeed, 
Giroux asserts that “postmodernism constitutes a general attempt to transgress the 
borders sealed by modernism, to proclaim the arbitrariness of all boundaries, and to call 
attention to the sphere of culture as a shifting social and historical construction” (55).  A 
pedagogy centered on exploring borders is performance of just the type of transgression 
Giroux situates in the postmodern.  This postmodern view of boundaries and borders 
makes such pedagogy possible; in a modernist construction of borders, creating this 
pedagogy would be fruitless because modernist borders are closed systems.  
Postmodernism gives us the opportunity to both interrogate and explore boundaries of 
all sorts. 
 
Ethos of the Borderlands and Postmodern Fragmentation 
In answer to the second challenge to teaching ethos, I contend that just as 
investigating borders can assist students in resisting the hegemony of the single Good 
and True, it can open a beneficent door on the fragmentation of postmodern life.  Rather 
than ignoring or despairing over the diverse ways of being in and interacting with the 
world, we can guide our students to think critically about fragments they encounter, 
about how we are inscribed by our environments.  Lugo contends that the instability of 
culture is at the heart of border theory: “Its temporality, its instability, its contingency, 
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and thus its fragmentation all give form and content to the theory of borderlands [. . .]” 
(53).   For composition courses where ethos is studied, border theory reinforces 
postmodern indeterminacy and fragmentation, whether we name them as such or not, 
and allows students to see them not as aberrations but as characteristics of 
contemporary life.  Likewise, the differences that fuel creation of borders may be seen 
as fragments that come into view only as we bring borders and their dwellers into focus.  
Though the modernist lens could view only monoliths, the postmodern lens focuses on 
fragments, the rich pieces that fill our world.  Rather than being just pieces to play with, 
as Baudrillard suggests, they are pieces to view clearly, to interrogate, to combine in 
new ways, and to validate.  
 
Ethos of the Borderland and Contemporary Technology 
 In answer to the third challenge to teaching ethos, I view students’ comfortable 
interactions with digital technology, especially in communications within networks and 
their ability to manipulate multiple media, as concrete support to increasing their 
understanding of border ethos.  As pointed out earlier in the Beloit College Mindset 
List, first-year students at this time are quite familiar with the avatars and virtual reality 
they see, create, and interact with on the Internet or in their video games.  Whether they 
have owned a virtual pet or created a Second Life or not, they know about these.  They 
have created new selves as they have communicated online through chat rooms or 
created their own websites or MySpace pages.  Such self-creation may be practiced 
routinely by our students but probably without any interrogation of the causes or effects 
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of such practices. Their familiarity with these activities, though, can serve as a prelude 
to more careful investigations of what the technology allows them to do, how that 
ability affects their conceptions of self, how their creations affect their audiences.  In 
many cases, when students create these new selves, they are practicing the construction 
of border ethos but without interrogation, tailoring their means of persuasion and their 
intended results toward a particular audience by selecting the most appropriate ethos for 
the rhetorical situation.  This “challenge” proves to be no challenge at all but a means 
by which we can connect border ethos to our students’ current practices and assist them 
in understanding the possible results.    
 That is not to say that technology does not present problems in our examinations 
of borders and border dwellers.  The challenge of widespread electronic 
communications resides in the availability and openness of discourses that create 
knowledge and serve as sites of power relations.  “Information” can be produced and 
distributed widely; such distribution can break down metanarratives or create new ones, 
depending on the power relations involved.  As Giroux points out, power takes new 
shapes with electronic technology, allowing it to be displayed and enacted across 
borders.  The results of this dispersion could be a calcifying of hegemonies, with power 
networks connecting across borders to reaffirm modernist values.  Even without digital 
communications, Giroux details some of the ways how modernism reaches outside the 
West: “Modernity now parades its universal message of progress through the experts 
and intellectuals it sends to Third World universities, through the systems of 
representations that it produces to saturate billboards all over Latin America, and/or 
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through advertising images it sends out from satellites to the television sets of 
inhabitants in Africa, India, and Asia” (57).  Add the volatile medium of digital 
networks throughout the world, and we find exponentially greater possibilities for either 
changing or reifying power structures.  The results depend on whether hegemonic 
discourses prevail or become disempowered.   
 Obviously, the effects of digital networks depend in large part on access: who 
has it and who does not?  The elitism of access has lessened somewhat with the 
development of less expensive computers and more widespread connections to the 
Internet, but there are still governments that limit access and still millions of people 
who do not have the hardware necessary participate in such discourses.  Nevertheless, 
the possibilities of power dispersed and collected through digital networks have 
changed borders and the ways people can communicate across them.  Giroux 
emphasizes this point in quoting Renato Rosaldo: “the Third World has imploded into 
the metropolis.  Even the conservative national politics of containment, designed to 
shield ‘us’ from ‘them,’ betray the impossibility of maintaining hermetically sealed 
cultures” (qtd. in Giroux 58).   Borders can either be dismantled or reconstituted by 
digital networks in ways we may not foresee.  This only underscores the importance of 
a population of technologically astute people who also know how to interrogate 
information and its sources.  Understanding ethos construction in an online environment 
is crucial to evaluating the information available through digital communications.   This 
is a special kind of border—between print and digital communications—that must be 
examined in a composition course with ethos at its center.  The play of creating new 
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selves online takes on more serious implications when we consider the ease of creating 
a persuasive electronic ethos that appears to be authoritative and credible. Anyone with 
access to the requisite hardware and software can be published, and with an eye for 
creating appealing images and texts, the publications can be very appealing.  Theresa 
Enos and Shane Borrowman address this capability in “Authority and Credibility: 
Classical Rhetoric, the Internet, and the Teaching of Techno-Ethos”:  
Concern over questions of authorship and authority on the Internet 
 develops out of a key concept in the traditionally defined history of 
 rhetoric: ethos.  Because the Internet is a virtual agora in which any 
 rhetor with a small amount of technological know-how and in possession 
 of minimal hardware can make her or his voice heard, our preoccupation 
 with this new technology turns, very naturally, to questions of credibility 
 and authority—to classical notions of ethos. 93 
I reiterate here, though, that classical conceptions of ethos are inadequate for the task.  
The differences between being and seeming are far more subtle in a digital environment 
than in the Roman senate.  Still, by problematizing classical conceptions of ethos and 
addressing manifestations of border ethos in both print and digital texts, we can at least 
increase our students’ awareness of issues of credibility and the effects of accepting 
authority without questioning. 
 In a pedagogy of border ethos, contemporary technology presents us and our 
students with ways to participate effectively in new discourses, with new ways to 
construct ethos through image and sound as well as text, and it presents us with 
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important questions about authority and credibility as they are used to enact power.  
Studying border ethos today requires the use and interrogation of discourses enabled 
and supported by computer use, especially in networks created by the Internet.  This 
particular challenge to teaching ethos in a composition course becomes a formative 
challenge: even in composition classes where ethos is not central, it must be addressed 
because of current uses of technology.  This “challenge” becomes serious rationale for 
including ethos in composition pedagogy. 
 
Ethos of the Borderland and the Developmental Stage of College Students 
 In answer to the fourth challenge to teaching ethos, I argue that despite the 
uncertainties students have about their identities when they are working through 
Erikson’s fifth stage, explorations of border ethos is not harmful to them.  It is possible, 
in fact, that “playing” with shifting ethos, working through multiple possibilities of 
displaying character in their discourses, allows students to explore their identities.  
Actually, the identity exploration that characterizes this stage of development could 
make students more amenable to the idea of practicing ethos construction that is not 
stable than they might be at other stages of development.   
Erikson’s assertion that fifth-stage older adolescents are challenged by the 
enlarged society in which they must operate is key to understanding our students’ 
developmental stage and the difficulties it presents.  The crisis occurs regardless of 
location, whether the older adolescent is in college or on the job or still living at home, 
but being in college can compound the difficulties.  For many students, the move to 
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campus is the first time they have lived apart from their families and away from familiar 
social structures, sources of some comfort, perhaps, as they work through these fifth-
stage problems.  Separation from familiar people and sites necessitated by a move to 
campus forces them to reshape their society.  It is possible, though, that learning about 
border ethos and practicing it could prove helpful; analyzing ethos for discourses with 
multiple audiences in multiple rhetorical situations can help adolescent students   know 
better how to navigate these broader waters, giving them opportunities to practice 
connecting and communicating in a variety of situations.  As students struggle to define 
themselves apart from their families of origin and perhaps even the geographic locations 
of their homes, the activity of imagining themselves in new discursive locations could 
be rewarding, giving them tools necessary for making new societal connections.  These 
effects, should they occur, are certainly not reasons to include ethos instruction in first-
year composition, but they could serve the students well.  The point is that this 
“challenge” may not be a challenge at all but may indicate a particular utility to the 
pedagogy.  
 
Ethos of the Borderland and Resistance to Postmodern Constructions of Subjectivity 
 At one point in Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mextiza, Gloria Anzaldua 
says that people who live on the United States-Mexican border develop “a dual 
identity—we don’t identify with the Anglo-American cultural values and we don’t 
totally identify with the Mexican cultural values.  We are a synergy of two cultures with 
various degrees of Mexicanness or Angloness.  I have so internalized the borderland 
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conflict that sometimes I feel like one cancels out the other and we are zero, nothing, no 
one” (63).  Later in her text, though, she reports a different response to living on the 
border, one which emphasizes “developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance 
for ambiguity [. . .]. [N]othing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing 
rejected, nothing abandoned [. . .]” (79).  In effect, she describes the subjectivity created 
by border life as both nothing and everything, a confusing proposition for anyone 
disciplined by modernist notions of a unified subject.  The dilemma of identifying with 
multiple cultures and languages and attempting to function in all of them creates an 
understanding of subjectivity and identity and self that is distinctly non-modern.  
Throughout Borderlands/La Frontera, Anzaldua reinforces the fluidity of border 
dwellers’ identities, asserting that living in such multiplicity frustrates and exhilarates.  
As she articulates in her preface, “Living on borders and in margins, keeping intact 
one’s shifting and multiple identity and integrity, is like trying to swim in a new 
element, an ‘alien’ element.”  For those of us who are not so conscious of the border 
elements that constitute our subjectivities, imagining such a swim can perhaps help us 
come to terms with postmodern conceptions of subjectivity.  
 As pointed out in the previous chapter, Lester Faigley locates some of the 
resistance to postmodern composition pedagogies in the persistence of modernist views 
of the self, in composition teachers, for example, holding onto the notion of the writer 
as an autonomous self.  If we are interested in creating pedagogies that are anchored in 
postmodernism with its interrogation of hegemonic social and political structures, 
however, we must find a way to release the hold of a modernist notion of self and its 
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relation to damaging binary thinking that results in oppression.  Failing to acknowledge 
and teach to the multiplicity of subject positions reinforces the modernist subject and its 
power to discipline.  
Too often, the academy is complicit in such reinforcement; the “academic self” 
is rarely acknowledged as one self among many but as the only one with value.  
Students are disciplined by this conception when they are forced to take on the 
academic identity, and they respond by knowing, on some level, the falsehood of that 
position: they have a sense of the rupture between who they are in the academic setting 
and who they are everywhere else, and the result can be the students’ alienation from 
their own education.  Institutionalized modernism erases the richness of their lives and 
the voices with which they can speak and write.  Ironically, in assuming students to be 
author/ities, modernist approaches to writing strip them of their power; the subject 
position that is supposed to have agency has none at all.  Though the ideal is that 
teachers of composition have theorized their pedagogies and thoughtfully generated 
classroom objectives and activities, there are still remnants of the most modernist 
pedagogy of all, current-traditional rhetoric.18  As Sharon Crowley points out in The 
Methodical Memory: Invention in Current-Traditional Rhetoric, “The pseudoscientific 
bias of the five-paragraph theme [. . .] substitutes the voice of the institution for those of 
writers [. . .]” (14) and “usurps students’ authority over their discourse” (150).  For too 
                                                
18 Despite the fact that “cur-trad” is known as “rhetoric,” Sharon Crowley contends that it is not.  Because 
current-traditional thinking minimizes or ignores audience and social context, “modern rhetorics are not 
especially rhetorical” (167).  Although I would like to think that current-traditional composition classes 
have disappeared along with the invigoration of postmodern theory, current-traditional formulations of 
writing still appear in the academy, frequently in disciplines outside English or composition and rhetoric, 
and present a challenge that composition teachers must overcome. 
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many students, the response is to have little interest in their writing, in their own 
construction of knowledge; instead, they participate in what Jasper Neel calls anti-
writing (qtd. in Crowley 148; and Welch, Electric Rhetoric 141), an exercise in “getting 
the job done” in order to pass the class.  Thus, students are disciplined in two ways 
when they are subjected to the power of modernist notions of rhetoric: first, they are 
forced to limit their thinking and writing to specific formulas; second, they are 
reminded that they are powerless in the face of the institution.  In both cases, power 
relations within the institution are confirmed, and students leave the university without 
a conception of the multiple subjectivities they enact or the multiple possibilities for 
writing situations.  Limiting students in this way naturalizes and maintains the status 
quo and socializes students into the class structures implicit within the modernist 
institution.  Crowley aptly says this is “smuggling middle-class social values into 
composition instruction by disguising them as inflexible rules for discursive behavior” 
(184).  The complexity of social constructions, subjectivities, and power relations is 
ignored in favor of forming well-behaved students who will leave uninterrogated the 
problems created by persistent hegemonies.  Welch puts this strongly in her critique of 
textbooks that 
  continue to reproduce the scourge of the two-hundred-year-old current-
  traditional paradigm with its faculty associationist psychology, its  
  gridlike boredom-inducing formulas, its commitment to obsessive error 
  correction, and, worst of all, its project of making student writers  
  develop great negativity toward their own writing—a result that leads to 
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  an uninformed citizenry bereft of rhetorical strategies, bereft of the 
  understanding  that the native tongue drives meaning (language speaks 
  us; we do not speak language), and bereft of the ability to change the 
  dominant culture. (150-151) 
As graduates of modernist institutions move into their adult lives with, perhaps, some 
power and influence, they proceed with faith in the modernist view of knowledge and 
writing and continue to support its hegemony in the world outside the academy.   
 Composition programs are also affected by the modernist construction of 
subject.  As long as composition teachers promote the modernist approach to writing, 
most fully realized in current-traditional rhetoric, there will be a disciplinary bias that 
devalues the teaching of composition.  As long as composition courses and programs 
focus on a unitary subject transmitting ideas via a current-traditional model, they will be 
seen, as Theresa Enos says, “as technicians, not scholars” (Enos, Gender Roles 38).  
This bias is, in part, well-deserved by composition faculty who buy into the modernist 
project, who resist activating postmodern views of subjectivity in their courses.  As long 
as modernist constructions of self and knowledge and language maintain their hold on 
the consciousness of the academy, composition will not be understood; professionals in 
composition will continue to be viewed as servants to the “greater good” of other 
disciplines.  Breaking the hold of the modernist paradigm demands a 
reconceptualization of what must go on in composition classes, and that must include a 
postmodern view of student/writer subjectivity.  
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 But the postmodern conception of subjectivity brings specific questions and 
difficulties related to agency.  Feminist concern over how agency can be maintained by 
the unstable subject exemplifies this significant difficulty.  Working toward attaining 
“full subject” status, some feminists view postmodern conceptions of subjectivity as 
disempowering, a removal of the possibility of agency.  As Nancy Hartsock, with good 
reason, complained, “Why is it, exactly at the moment when so many of us who have 
been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than 
objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes ‘problematic’” 
(qtd. in Grewal and Kaplan 233).  Henry Giroux considers this dilemma an example of 
how postmodernism lends itself to a reformulation of agency itself: 
  Postmodern feminism provides a grounded politics that employs the 
  most progressive aspects of modernism and postmodernism.  In the most 
  general sense it reaffirms the important of difference as part of a broader 
  political struggle for the reconstruction of public life.  It rejects all forms 
  of essentialism but recognizes the importance of certain formative  
  narratives.  Similarly, it provides a language of power that engages the 
  issue of inequality and struggle.  In recognizing the importance of  
  institutional structures and language in the construction of subjectivities 
  and political life, it promotes social criticism that acknowledges the 
  interrelationship between human agents and social structures, rather than 
  succumbing to a social theory without agents or one in which agents are 
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  simply the product of broad structural and ideological forces. (Border 
  Crossings 71) 
Viewing postmodern agency in this way should ease some of the resistance on the part 
of both composition instructors and students, giving them a way to conceive of the 
writer as a functioning agent in specific situations and locations. 
 
The Power of Border Ethos in Composition Pedagogy 
 I opened this chapter with reasons why borders provide us with an apt trope for 
the location of ethos and then elaborated on those fairly innocuous and understated 
reasons to raise some larger and more significant issues to consider in theorizing 
composition pedagogy: construction of and response to difference; foundations of 
power and resistance; conceptions of self, identity, subjectivity, and agency; 
hegemonies created by modernism; and the position of composition within largely 
modernist institutions.  The presentation of these points uncovers the enthymeme that 
guides my interest in teaching with a focus on border ethos.  In so doing, teachers can 
not only reach the stipulated goals of composition (to help students develop rhetorical 
understanding, begin to claim their own discursive space, and think critically about 
discursive contexts) but can also enact a critical pedagogy, increasing the possibility 
that students will be better able to perform as humane, thoughtful, and just members of 
our democracy.  I take to heart Henry Giroux’s earnest appeal that we link “education to 
the imperatives of a critical democracy” (Border Crossings 73), and I see 
reconceptualizing ethos as a means by which such a link can be forged in composition 
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courses and programs.  Using Giroux’s criteria for developing a transformative, critical 
education as a guide, I outline in the next chapter how a pedagogy focusing on border 






















Chapter 4: Locating Border Ethos in Composition Pedagogy 
 
 
 In an earlier chapter I asserted that a goal of rhetorical education today is the 
same as rhetorical education in ancient times, that we still intend to prepare students for 
their roles as citizens.  The importance or possibility of this goal is, of course, contested; 
still, I believe it is a significant goal, not only for rhetorical education but for all liberal 
education.  I see myself as, in Giroux’s terms, a “cultural worker” and believe that the 
most important job I do is to help engage students’ critical skills as they think and act as 
citizens, both of the United States and of the world.  In Border Crossings, Giroux 
explains the importance, especially in the United States, of critical pedagogy as a 
support for democracy: 
 [A] number of polls indicate that while the youth of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Germany are extending the frontiers of democracy, 
American youth are both unconcerned and largely ill-prepared to 
struggle for and keep democracy alive in the twenty-first century. 
   Rather than being a model of democracy, the United States has 
  become indifferent to the need to struggle for the conditions that make 
  democracy a substantive rather than a lifeless activity. (72) 
This concern about youth and democracy echoes the concern expressed by classical 
rhetoricians.  Isocrates’ interest, for example, in educating the boys of Athens, training 
them to “think right,” was not without purpose; his goal was to support the strength of 
the state by preparing the next generation of leaders.  As I pointed out in the first 
chapter, Plato, Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero, like Isocrates, were deeply invested in 
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education and its role in creating an effective citizenry.  The seriousness of this function 
of education fueled their concern about the virtue of rhetors: they wanted to prepare 
citizens and leaders who had wisdom and who could make considered decisions—a 
goal no different from the one expressed by Giroux and held by many in higher 
education today.  Despite twenty-five hundred years of changes in material conditions, 
ways of thinking, communicating, and experiencing the world, it seems we are not so 
different from rhetoric teachers of Athens and Rome.  Of course, because of the changes 
in material conditions, ways of thinking, communicating, and experiencing the world, 
our methods have changed.  As previous chapters have asserted, our understanding of 
how values are shaped have complicated the development of pedagogies.   The 
philosophy of teaching and the resulting methods employed by the ancients were not 
complicated by the contingency and indeterminacy that concern twenty-first century 
teachers and theorists.  We are faced with the task of responding to modern and 
postmodern sensibilities and contemporary material conditions by generating 
pedagogies that engage students and support their learning in complex contexts.  
Obviously, I believe that giving attention to ethos as conceptualized within current 
sensibilities and conditions, can provide an appropriate option for composition 
pedagogy.  Though I have provided rationale through previous chapters for creating 
such a pedagogy, it is important to illustrate teaching practices that support the theory.  I 
begin by stipulating characteristics of the border. 
 Although borders are conceptualized in many different ways, this border trope 
must have specific characteristics.  It cannot, for example, be a closed, nor can it be 
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inhabited by only people who speak a single language.  The border under consideration 
here can be imagined not as a line but as an area, one which may at times appear to be 
stable and impenetrable but which takes on different shapes and can be entered and 
exited.  The inhabitants of this border area are varied, with many languages spoken and 
many different sets of cultural practices.  Some of these inhabitants speak all of the 
languages of the area; others speak primarily if not solely one language.  Regardless of 
language, though, the inhabitants are involved in multiple and varied discursive acts, 
but all discourses take place in person; communication is always in the present so that 
the rhetor has a greater investment in ethos. Although this area’s inhabitants are willing 
to communicate, doing so can be difficult.  Differences among the inhabitants are 
multiple; sometimes difference is obvious, other times hidden.  Some inhabitants are in 
the area because they must be; others choose to remain there.  Some are natives, others 
from distant places.  For all, though, it is a difficult place to be because the differences 
are sometimes challenging to live with.  Within this area, a variety of groups has 
formed, some of them based on language, some on shared cultural practices, some 
because they have power over others, some because they lack power.  This is not a 
place free from oppression or injustice, but one where democracy is valued to varying 
degrees by the inhabitants.   
 Contrasting this discursive space and its inhabitants with the spaces occupied 
and written about by ancient rhetoricians supports the claim that a different ethos is 
needed for rhetorical participation here: while the ethos the ancients conceptualized 
could be based on shared values and language, a border ethos cannot.  In border 
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discourses, effective rhetors discern difference with respect rather than as a means to 
exclude or to exoticize, and they resist universalizing, relying instead on the local to 
inform them.  In constructing ethos for a rhetorical moment, effective border rhetors 
work to know the values of their audiences, and they distinguish where rhetor-audience 
values intersect, creating a space for clearer communication, greater understanding, and 
persuasion.  The border rhetor understands that power is enacted within relationships, 
even between individuals, and respects the individual powers of the parties in discourse.  
Effective rhetors understand that there is no single source of authority and that 
constructing a persuasive ethos includes not only knowing but using, when available, 
modes of authority and credibility valued by the audience.  Creating ethos in border 
discourses is not easy; it requires multiple types of thinking—analytic (to understand 
the locations, subjectivities, and values of the audience), synthetic (to find points of 
intersection between differences), evaluative (to think critically about what things are 
most important), and creative (to imagine the situations of people who are different and 
predict the effects of their discursive constructions).   
Although I have no intention of presenting a series of lesson plans for 
instruction in border ethos, I would like to propose some types of activities designed to 
help students understand and practice border ethos.  Clearly, a teacher cannot simply 
stipulate the above descriptions of borderlands and border ethos and expect students to 
learn from them.  Some concepts in border ethos can be addressed fairly easily, such as 
making clear that within border areas language difference and cultural practices are 
issues, and can be handled in the classroom through examples and models.   Textbooks, 
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even some of the ones I reviewed in the first chapter, provide activities that teachers can 
adapt.  Such class activities are fairly common, often conducted to present the concepts 
of voice, but as I pointed out in an earlier chapter, this is a weak substitute for ethos.  
Focusing on voice tends to oversimplify, attending to level of language, for example, or 
determining if the writer has adopted a humorous or serious or cynical way of dealing 
with the subject matter.  Focusing on voice does not get at the heart of ethos and its full 
integration into a text; instead, it suggests that the tone or arrangement or language is an 
add-on, a flourish that exists in a space outside the real text.  Ethos is a significant part 
of the text and, though it is a construction, it is not an “extra.”  It includes a special 
richness that informs texts by revealing writers’ attitudes about themselves and their 
audiences, their intentions and values.  Ethos is revealed in ways far more complex than 
in the level of language that writers use; it is revealed through what they tell and what 
they omit, through what they tell first and last, through their means of addressing the 
audience.  I would suggest that teachers interested in developing students’ 
understanding of ethos expand on exercises typically presented for determining “voice” 
or “credibility,” having students interrogate texts more deeply.  Following the lead of 
Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters in Everything’s an Argument, teachers can ask 
students to consider political and cultural attitudes evidenced through ethos and to look 
for how the ethos remains consistent or where there appear to be inconsistencies, for 
example.  They can ask students to examine the use of first-person pronouns and how 
they affect ethos, and they can have students rewrite texts or prepare images or revise 
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their own writing to shift the variables that add up to ethos, changing connotative 
words, reordering, truncating or adding text. 
Other steps in preparing classroom activities for instruction in border ethos are 
far more difficult: helping students to imagine themselves with different subjectivities 
presents one of the largest challenges, not only because the modernist notion of 
subjectivity persists but also because this activity will be performed inside the academy, 
a place notoriously unresponsive to making spaces for different subjects, especially in 
its institutionalized discourse.  Difficult or not, though, we must explore ways to help 
students to first understand that there are differences in subjectivities and second to 
imagine different identities, new ways to be. 
We can draw on the work of feminist scholars in composition for assistance in 
this pedagogical problem.  Recognition of multiple subjectivities is enacted when 
feminists work towards the inclusion of diverse discourses in rhetorical scholarship.  
Attention to rhetors, usually women, whose work has been discounted or ignored 
because they did not fit the traditional paradigm of rhetoric has provided us with greater 
diversity of contexts, ways of thinking, and means of expression.  Serious consideration 
of platform speakers such as Sojourner Truth and pamphleteers such as Ida B. Wells has 
raised important possibilities of subject construction into the academic consciousness,19 
and reconceiving the histories of rhetoric by including women such as Sappho, Diotima, 
and Aspasia, as well as the often disregarded Sophists such as Gorgias and Isocrates, 
has made clear that the modernist view derived from Plato through Aristotle into the 
                                                
19 See Shirley Wilson Logan’s With Pen and Voice and Jacqueline Jones Royster’s Southern Horrors and 




Enlightenment was constructed with disregard for multiple possibilities of subject.20  In 
most cases, this work has opposed the modernist construction of subject.  Indeed, the 
enthusiasm for rehistoricizing classical rhetoric grows out of a desire to change the 
modern rhetorical consciousness.  Glenn, Jarratt, and Welch, in particular, in their 
interrogations of foundational assumptions about classical rhetoric, have provided ways 
to theorize a non-modern rhetoric.  In Electric Rhetoric, Welch calls for an Isocratic 
Sophistic in theorizing what she calls Next Rhetoric, a means for understanding and 
deploying the language of our world, a world which includes the aural/orality of 
television and visuality of computer screens.  A compelling reason for Welch’s focus on 
Isocrates, and a reason that compels me to include such thinking in theorizing a 
pedagogy of border ethos, is that Isocrates is not modern.  We can begin to understand 
for ourselves and to create opportunities for our students to understand a different 
subjectivity by bolstering our knowledge of subject construction with non-modern 
examples.  Classical rhetoric, with valuable scholarship already underway, is an 
excellent place to begin imagining a non-modern subject.  It may seem odd to suggest 
exploring different conceptions of subjectivities and selves in classical rather than 
postmodern texts.  I do so for good reason.  Though postmodernism rejects modernist 
thought and construction of the self, its raison d’être is modernism.  The classical 
consciousness, however, is simply apart from modernism, not a rejection whose 
existence depends upon it.   
                                                
20 See Cheryl Glenn’s Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the 
Renaissance, Susan C. Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured, and Kathleen 
Welch’s The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse for 
their inclusionary work with rhetors traditionally rejected in rhetorical studies. 
 
 120 
 Still, there are problems with using classical texts in first-year composition 
classes to help students understand different ways of viewing the self: the texts present 
the challenge of reading and understanding translated classical languages, and they 
often require a basic understanding of philosophy that may distract from the purpose at 
hand.  I am not suggesting that Greek and Roman rhetoricians and philosophers have no 
place in the composition curriculum, only that they may not be the best texts to assist 
students in conceiving of differing constructions of the self.  Narratives, however, from 
any number of non-Western21 writers are more accessible and may be better resources 
for providing students with the experience of imagining other selves. 
 American Indian narratives, for example, provide a rich resource for considering 
non-modern constructions of the self.  Because they are stories, they draw us into the 
world of the characters, not through an abstract representation of ideas but through 
location and action and discourse, and we can experience imaginatively how inhabiting 
a non-modern subject position feels.  Before providing a specific pedagogical example 
of working with an American Indian text, I want to present some important caveats.   
First, because working with non-modern texts requires finding sources typically 
written by non-Western people, the writers, as well as the cultures from which they 
write, are oftentimes marginalized in the dominant, Euro-centric culture of the West.  
Actually, that is part of their value: they have been marginalized because they do not 
meet the hegemonic modernist standards.  But using texts by writers from marginalized 
groups must be done carefully, with awareness of the tendency to reduce, stereotype, 
                                                
21 What constitutes a non-Western writer is the subject of debate.  For the purposes of this project, I 
consider a non-Western writer anyone who writes with a sensibility other than modernist.  The distinction 
is not geographical, nor is it racial or ethnic.   
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essentialize, and exoticize them and their work, and such tendencies must be resisted 
persistently.  The point of working with their texts is to create imaginary experience that 
can help students to consider subjectivities other than the modernist one that continues 
to discipline them, not to set up yet another binary of “us” and “them,” either to 
glamorize or to demonize.  Anzaldua writes about how ethnocentrism devalues native 
work and appropriates it in harmful ways: 
  Ethnocentrism is the tyranny of Western aesthetics.  An Indian mask in 
  an American museum is transposed into an alien aesthetic system where 
  what is missing is the presence of power invoked through performance 
  ritual.  It has become a dead “thing” separated from nature and,  
  therefore, its power. 
   Modern Western painters have “borrowed,” copied, or otherwise 
  extrapolated the art of tribal cultures and called it cubism, surrealism, 
  symbolism.The music, the beat of the drum, the Blacks’ jive talk.  All 
  taken over.  Whites, along with a good number of our own people, have 
  cut themselves off from their spiritual roots, and they take our spiritual 
  art objects in an unconscious attempt to get them back.  If they’re going 
  to do it, I’d like them to be aware of what they are doing and to go about 
  doing it the right way.  Let’s stop importing Greek myths and the  
  Western Cartesian split point of view and root ourselves in the  
  mythological soil and soul of this continent.  White America has only 
  attended to the body of the earth in order to exploit it, never to succor it 
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  or to be nurtured in it.  Instead of surreptitiously ripping off the vital 
  energy of people of color and putting it to commercial use, whites could 
  allow themselves to share and exchange and learn from us in a respectful 
  way. (68)  
We most definitely must not misappropriate, exoticize, or essentialize the texts which 
we introduce to our students, and we want to teach them to read the texts of people who 
are different than they are in respectful, non-totalizing ways.   
Second, I am quite aware that so far I have said nothing about teachers and 
students who are from marginalized groups, that I have been writing as if all of us, 
teachers and students, are from the traditionally dominant group in the United States, 
but I fully recognize that some of us who teach and some of our students are very likely 
from groups marginalized because of their race, ethnicity, class, or religion.  Although 
the constitution of our classes is of concern when we work with such texts, the point is 
to have students experience the texts for understanding non-modern subjectivities, and 
regardless of race, ethnicity, class, or religion, if students are in our college courses, 
they have very likely been thoroughly disciplined by modernist notions of subjectivity.  
And if we have, for example, Indian students in our classes when we are working with 
Indian texts, it is quite possible that they have not experienced the subjectivities under 
discussion—unless they have lived entirely immersed in their tribal culture.  Even then, 
the exercise of reading and experiencing and discussing Indian texts can perhaps help 
them in understanding some of the unstated challenges in their work as college students.  
If we take Giroux’s imperatives for critical pedagogy seriously, we are compelled to 
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focus on margins, allowing our students to know sites of struggle, especially the 
struggles against modernist binaries established to silence or oppress.  Focusing on the 
margins of difference as they are expressed in narratives by and about people who have 
been outside dominant ways of being and thinking can open doors to understanding and 
respect. 
To illustrate a pedagogical move that can help students understand different 
conceptions of self, I turn to LeAnne Howe’s “Blood Sacrifice,” a story that frames her 
novel Shell Shaker, though it was written and published prior to the novel.  Rather than 
including the whole text of the story here, I present a critical reading of this story 
focusing on how self is constructed and how it differs from the modern construction of 
the unitary, autonomous subject.  By looking closely at this story, situated in Choctaw 
thought and culture, we can begin to conceive of a world without binaries, most 
particularly a world where self and community are fully integrated. 
This narrative unites opposing qualities that would be viewed as binaries in a 
modernist view.  For example, though the modernist view might understand peace and 
killing, warrior and peacemaker as opposites, “Blood Sacrifice” illuminates their unity.  
In this narrative, Tuscalusa and Grandmother of Birds exemplify the integration of 
warrior and peacemaker.  Though Tuscalusa, Black Warrior, goes into battle with De 
Soto, Grandmother is fully involved in his actions.  The stone he gives her to swallow 
holds his spirit, and she gives him a kasmo, “a feathered shawl with locks of her hair 
woven through it” (204), which holds her spirit.  Warrior and peacemaker are fully 
integrated in both characters.  Even after their deaths, for generations, they appear 
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together, always as birds—eagles, hawks, and swans.  The archetypal warrior and 
peacemaker are complements to one another in both life and death. 
In this story, the unity of self and community is crucial, for without the 
integration of individual and community, a blood sacrifice will not work.  The only way 
the supposed offense Shakbatina’s daughter, Anoleta, has committed can be ameliorated 
is for the community itself to suffer a loss, and that can be done through the death of 
Shakbatina.  Such a substitution works only because the individual is not of prime 
importance.  Shakbatina’s execution is a just retribution to restore balance to the 
community. 
This view that an individual is integrated into the community does not imply 
that individual actions are insignificant.  The individual does not disappear into 
community but is deeply integrated into it, and an individual’s actions can have lasting 
effects on the people of the community.  Just as one person can infect a blanket with 
small pox and cause the deaths of many people, so, too, can one person’s daily 
decisions affect a community.  Shakbatina understands the effect of her apparently 
insignificant decision to send her daughter on an errand: 
 In a way I am responsible for the disaster at the Red Fox village.  I had 
  sent Anoleta to them as an emissary of our town.  I was still recovering 
  from the Inkilish disease that had killed so many people.  She was to 
  exchange vegetable seeds and bowls filled with special healing plants for 
  flints. (206) 
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Shakbatina’s decision places her daughter in a serious situation which could result in 
war.  To prevent war, Shakbatina stands in for Anoleta.  Her sacrifice is an individual 
act which restores peace and balance to the community. 
 The view of self in “Blood Sacrifice” includes fluidity that allows 
transformations from and to human forms.  Tuscalusa leaves his spirit with 
Grandmother of Birds and becomes a shell; the Seven Grandmothers transform into 
birds in their effort to save themselves and reestablish their home; and the warrior 
observed by the young Shakbatina “slips[s] out of his body and into na tohbi” (208).  
The older Shakbatina, soon to be executed, says she “know[s] when it is time to return 
to the earth (205) and declares, “When I am released I will grow up through the earth 
and sprout like green corn.  From the summit of the mound I will guard our people.  Do 
not cry for me, I am a fast grower” (210).  Finally, after Shakbatina’s execution, she 
tells of her transformation: 
  I feel myself growing younger in this place.  When I look back at my 
  body, blood is seeping out of my head and flecks of bone are strewn 
  through my hair [. . .].  An unknown language floats around me.  Each 
  word is in Old Code I must decipher.  Suddenly there are streaks of 
  white, and the delicious scent of tobacco fills the air as the spirit of an 
  animal appears.  Big Mother Porcupine walks into view and takes me by 
  the hand. (218) 
These transformations are not linear, permanent changes.  In Western thought, 
transformation typically is regarded as something that occurs when one autonomous 
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being or thing changes into another.  In “Blood Sacrifice,” transformation does not 
occur in that way.  The Seven Grandmothers change into birds for a time but become 
women again when they are out of danger, and when Shakbatina dies, she is not simply 
removed to another realm but remains in this world, living on in her daughters and 
guarding her people.  To understand this type of transformation, we must conceive of 
the quality of wholeness among beings, understanding that, as Shakbatina’s husband 
tells her, “one thing can hold the essence of another” (213).  Transformations can take 
place because the possibilities of other incarnations are already there.  The 
Grandmothers can become birds because they already hold the essence of birds, and 
Shakbatina can live on in her daughters because they already hold her essence. 
 Adopting the view that people can, indeed, hold essences of other beings is an 
enormous challenge to modernist, Western thinking, and it explodes binaries, even that 
most persistent division between self and others.  If we can adopt this view, 
acknowledging that we are full of the essences of others, we cannot continue to 
maintain that the self is unitary and autonomous.  We can understand self only in terms 
of community—the community of our ancestors, our current families, friends, and 
acquaintances, and other beings. 
 This story also demonstrates the destructive power of binary thinking, especially 
the destructive power of thinking about the self as autonomous.  The modernist 
conception of self and its separation from others has wreaked havoc on all people not 
conforming to the masculine, white, elitist, Western hegemony.  When binaries of self 
and community, mine and yours persist, damage ensues.  We can see this very clearly in 
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“Blood Sacrifice” with the incursions of whites into the Choctaws’ lands.  At every 
step, from De Soto to the influence of white culture on the Red Fox people, the events 
of this narrative are affected by the growing presence of whites.  And all of the damage 
is generated from a conception of the world that separates individual from community 
and allows for, even valorizes, individual possession of land and wealth.  De Soto and 
the other whites who follow him, all disciplined by post-Enlightenment notions of self 
and conquest, see their actions as somehow their right. 
Reading, analyzing, and discussing stories such as this with students presents   
opportunities for them to at least begin to understand alternate possibilities of self, if not 
to integrate the experiences of different selves into their imagination.  The function of 
this particular type of exercise, though, is solely to focus on the self as revealed through 
characterization in a narrative to effect imagining different possibilities of subjectivity, 
not an investigation of ethos. Such an exercise can move students toward 
disempowering the modernist view of the self before they begin exploring the selves 
they manifest through their writing. 
A series of exercises with narratives essays could introduce students to ethos. 
The series should begin with the teacher modeling ethos analysis in a sample essay, 
guiding students to find clues to the ethos displayed based on the choices—in specific 
language, in sentence construction and patterns, in depth of detail, in arrangement—the 
writer has made.  Students then can begin to perform their own ethos analyses, 
beginning perhaps in pairs or small groups to share insights about what ethos is 
displayed and how it is constructed, later working alone on the same tasks.  
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Focusing on this kind of work in the composition class takes time.  It would be 
possible to spend an entire semester working with print texts, but that would be a 
mistake.  Students must be given the opportunity to interrogate ethos as it can be 
produced in multiple discursive situations, especially with images and text design.  
Because of the pervasiveness of the visual in contemporary United States culture, we 
would be doing a huge injustice to ignore it as a site for study.  Theresa Enos and Shane 
Borrowman explain a series of activities they have found useful in helping students’ 
awareness of “techno-ethos,” the creation of online credibility and authority, by using 
holocaust denial websites, which students analyze to evaluate how key people are 
presented through their credentials, the texts they author, images of them, even the use 
of font size, type, and color of the various texts.  Such analysis, say Enos and 
Borrowman, leads students to see the ease with which websites can be made to appear 
credible and to understand the importance of ethos in persuasion (93-109). 
I would suggest that, though such exercises are of great value, we lead students 
beyond them to give them experience in interrogating their own instances of techno-
ethos.  As I mentioned earlier, most students today participate in online social networks 
such as Facebook and MySpace, where they have the opportunity to construct ethos that 
can be seen, maybe heard, by hundreds of thousands of people.  These sites have easily 
accessible tools for creating pages with whatever appeals their participants choose.  
Students today have the tools to create multi-media ethos whether they are on the social 
networking sites or not; that is not the issue.  Our task is to help them consider not only 
what they do when they construct these pages but why they make the choices they do 
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and what the results of these choices might be.  Using social networking sites in the 
composition classroom is a simple way for students to begin to take techno-ethos 
seriously as a border location requiring interrogation: Who has power on these sites and 
how is it made manifest?  What constitutes credibility and authority? In what ways is 
difference accepted or rejected?  What are the results of specific power relations?  In 
what ways do these social sites oppress or suppress people?  What language must be 
spoken for persuasive communication? In what ways do these sites work toward human 
empowerment, and in what ways do they do harm?  When students participate in the 
discourses available in these social networks what ethos do they intend and why?  Do 
they experiment with different selves, or do they try to project a stable self, “who they 
really are?”  Questions such as these can lead to a relevant understanding of ethos in a 
volatile context and support a critical pedagogy that calls to question students’ 
“citizenship” in a specific social site. 
The exercises and activities I have referenced to this point are examples of 
pedagogical moves that can be made to effect the goals of composition through a focus 
on border ethos.  All of them support the development of rhetorical understanding; all 
of them demand consideration of rhetorical contexts, and all of them encourage students 
to claim their own discursive space 
Constructing composition courses and programs that center on border ethos can 
support a critical pedagogy.  Work with ethos necessitates giving attention to 
subjectivities and how they are constructed; locating ethos in borderlands necessitates 
giving attention to difference and the conflicts that can arise from it.  Work with ethos 
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implies a consideration of ethics that is deeply integrated into social processes and 
relations and allows critique of social constructions and power.  Work with ethos 
requires interaction with the local rather than the universal, with contingencies rather 
than stability.  These characteristics allow creation of a critical pedagogy as Henry 
Giroux outlines.   
I rely heavily on Giroux for my understanding of critical pedagogy for several 
reasons: (1) though his theories share similarities with other thinkers such as Paolo 
Friere, his ideas are framed by experiences, politics, and cultures of the contemporary 
United States; (2) he views the role of critical educators as working for transformation 
toward liberation and justice and for shaping democratic subjects; (3) his work 
integrates theory and practice; (4) it centers on the lived lives of people, especially 
students; (5) he gives attention to the disciplining functions of language and knowledge 
in human experience; (6) regarding oppression, he focuses on multiple categories—e.g., 
race, class, gender—rather than only one; (7) he recognizes higher education as a site of 
struggle and possibility; and (8) as a public intellectual, he has written and continues to 
write frequently and prolifically.   
Giroux presents us with models for thinking about and producing pedagogies 
that aim for ideals significant to the goals of higher education within a democracy.  For 
my purposes in this project, I begin with Giroux’s model of critical pedagogy and its 
nine criteria as articulated in Border Crossings: 
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1. Towards the goal of empowering people in their lives, critical pedagogy must 
investigate identities, power, agency, and struggle as they exist in social and 
political spheres (73-74). 
2.  An ethics of social responsibility must be a basis for developing pedagogies 
(74). 
3. Identities and categories of difference must be understood as constructions and 
interrogated (75).  
4. Knowledge must be viewed as dynamic, and the contingent and the quotidian 
valued as worthy of study (75-76). 
5. There must be an emphasis on how knowledge is created and who gets to create 
it (76). 
6. The understanding of reasoning needs to be expanded to include more than the 
“universal” logic of the Enlightenment (77). 
7. Both critique and possibility need to inform us (77-78). 
8.  Teachers must function as cultural workers, able to both acknowledge and 
interrogate the social and the personal as constituted by and operating within 
specific contexts (78-79). 
9.  The intended result should be engagement on a personal and political level to 
move society away from oppression (80). 
These criteria can be understood and employed in multiple institutional sites of higher 
education—in general education programs, history courses, interdisciplinary studies, at 
the graduate or undergraduate level—and considering how they might take shape in 
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each of these contexts is interesting but not the purpose of this current project.  Instead, 
the task is to situate them in relation to composition pedagogy, most specifically a 
composition pedagogy with border ethos as a significant element. 
Interestingly enough, when critical pedagogy with ethos at its center is enacted 
in a composition course or program, it contributes to developing good character on the 
part of our students.  Taking ethos seriously, examining intersections of difference, and 
interrogating social and political structures as they relate to individuals’ lives allows 
character to grow by accretion: it is a process of understanding and taking responsibility 
for social relations and personal actions that affect them.  The question which 
confounds some of us when we study ethos as a classical rhetorical construction—
whether it is created for the moment of discourse or it resides in the rhetor—can be 
answered: ethos is displayed in discursive moments, and it resides in the rhetor who 
develops the habits fostered by critical pedagogy, emancipatory habits that serve to 
eliminate tyranny and oppression.   
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